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Abstract 
We analyze a simple overlapping generation model of the financial market in which 
asset price is determined by reactions of noisy traders and rational arbitrageurs over 
expected retum and retum risk. De Long et al. (1990) argued that noise traders� 
stochastic beliefs in expected retum causes excessive price volatility and results in an 
unique noisy equilibrium (i.e. price varies with noise) even in the absence of 
fundamental risk. Ravi Bhushan (1997) argued that, if noise traders have irrational 
beliefs in retum risk, multiple noisy equilibria can coexist with the classical 
equilibrium (i.e. riskless perpetuity is priced by arbitrage). We show that De Long�s 
and Bhushans models are based on different assumptions about noise traders^  
reaction to arbitrageurs over retum risk. In a general model with noise traders� 
beliefs being linear transformations of that of arbitrageurs, (i) asset price is a 
weighted average ofnoise traders�and arbitrageurs�beliefs; and (ii) price risk rises 
as noise traders�perceived retum risk falls relative to that of arbitrageurs. In addition, 
if the difference in investors�perceived expected retums is an independent and 
identical process, expected asset price is a decreasing fonction of noise traders^  
relative perceived retum risk either (i) when noise traders are sufficiently bullish in 
the sense that they have high perceived expected retum or (ii) when fundamental risk 
is sufficiently high. 
Note: expected retum (price) is measured by mean of retum (price); retum ft>rice) risk is 






De Long et aL (1990)認爲非理性投資者對預期回報隨機的評估是價格過度變動 
的主因；而無論資產有否基本風險，其價格也是處於單一的謠傳均衡狀態(即 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction- The Reaction Approach 
We intend to construct a model in which the roles of noise traders and rational 
arbitrageurs in asset price determination are symmetric in every aspect. We wiU 
derive an equilibrium pricing function in terms of reactions between the two parties 
to study the effects of noise traders�beliefs on the expected level and variance of 
asset price in cases where there is and there is no fiindamental risk.^  We will show 
that if noise traders�perceived retum variance falls relative to that of rational 
arbitrageurs, the true retum variance falls. Another contribution of this paper is that it 
sheds light on the conflicting outcomes between De Long et al. (1987), (1989), 
(1990a)，(1990b), (1991) and Ravi Bhushan (1997) regarding the implications of 
unpredictable noise traders' beliefs on excessive price volatility. 
Traditional theory of asset pricing model indicates that in a world of only 
rational arbitrageurs, who conduct trade based on rational expectation, the price of 
any financial asset is equal to its fundamental value. Accordingly, the price of an 
asset paying a riskless cashflow (d) in each period eternally (p"'^ ® )^ is equal to the 
value of this cashflow discounted by the riskfree interest rate: 
nsMess ^^^_J_^_J_^_L^^_i_^^•••".]二义(1) 
(l + r) (l + r)2 (l + rf (l + r ” r 
1 Expected retum and retum variance corresponds to retum and risk respectively in financial market 
literature since retum is measured by expected retum and risk is measured by variance respectively. 
Every\^iiere in this paper those tams such as expected retum and retum, variance and risk can be used 
interchangeably unless otherwise specified. 
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For asset paying a risky cashflow with an expected value (d) each period, price (p"®^ 
is adjusted by a risk premium which is determined by the rational expectation of 
arbitrageurs regarding retum variance to reflect the cost of bearing fundamental risk 
in the market: 
p"s^ 二 4 - rationally perceived risk premium. (2) r 
In both cases, expected price is a martingale in the sense that it is a constant. 
Introducing noise trader into this world would not change the price of the 
asset in case there is no fundamental risk, since arbitrageurs are wiUing to take an 
infinite position, given riskless arbitrage opportunity, and bring asset price to 
fundamental value. Hence, (1) holds in the presence of noise traders as welL^ 
However, noise traders have influence on asset price when there is fundamental risk 
since risk-averse arbitrageurs�willingness to bet against noise traders is restricted? 
In contrast to the efficient market theorem for which asset prices are equal to the 
fundamental values and noise traders have no impact on prices, fundamental risk 
causes noisy price, i.e. (2) does not hold in the presence of noise traders/ 
De Long et al. (1987), (1989), (1990a)，（1990b), (1991) argued that there is 
another source of risk in addition to fimdamental risk if noise traders exist, and that is 
2 That arbitrageurs are wilUng to take an infinite position in face of riskless arbitrage opportunity is a 
strong assumption that ignores other restrictions on trade. For example, arbitrageurs' wilUngness and 
ability may be restricted if there are position limits (see Bhushan (1997), participation costs (see Allen 
(1994), Qrosel (1997,1998))，and imperfect information (see Froot (1992), Qrosel (1996)). Therefore, 
the proposition that arbitrageurs' willingness to take an infinite position ensures asset price is set at (1) 
is not exactly satisfied in reality. 
3 The idea that arbitrage is limited by aversion to fimdamental risk has been studied by many authors. 
They are, for example, Figlewski (1979)，Grossman and Miller (1988)，Campbell and Kyle (1993), 
etc. 
4 Some argue that noise traders who trade based on erroneous beliefs would have no influence on asset 
price in the long run even in the presence of fimdamental risk since they will continuously lose money 
to arbitrageurs and disappears from the market. See Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965). 
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the unpredictability of noise traders�beliefs.^ This noise trader risk restricts 
arbitrageurs' willingness to trade against noise traders in exactly the same way as 
fundamental risk. By assuming that the difference in expected retums perceived by 
noise traders and arbitrageurs is a stochastic process and noise traders�make correct 
expectation regarding retum variance, De Long showed that asset prices deviate from 
the fundamental value even in the absence of fundamental risk, i.e. (1) does not hold 
in the presence of noise traders. In an overlapping generation framework, De Long 
showed that a unique noisy equilibrium exists.^ Thus, De Long argued that ‘ Noise 
traders create their own spacd 7 
Ravi Bhushan (1997) reinvestigated the same model by arguing that noise 
traders may have irrational expectation regarding retum variance as well as expected 
retum. Following De Long, Bhushan assumed that noise traders�perceived expected 
retum is the sum of arbitrageurs�perceived expected retums and a stochastic 
component; unHke De Long, he assumes that noise traders�perceived retum variance 
is independent of that of arbitrageurs/ In the same model, Bhushan showed that in 
the absence of fundamental risk, multiple equilibria exist: classical equilibrium 
always exists, and up to two noisy equilibria may exist which exhibit conflicting 
comparative statics with respect to the effect of increasing the number of noisy 
5 See Shleifer and Summers (1990) for a detailed summary of most of the ideas introduced by De Long. 
6 De Long proposed that noise trader risk could be used to explain a large number of observations in 
financial market as well. These include the mean reversion of stock returns，the underpricing of 
closed-end mutual ftmds, the Mdu*a-Prescott equity premium puzzle. 
7 De Long was the first one to model the idea that unpredictability of noise traders�expectations 
causes excessive price volatility. He introduced a new series to the literature ofnoise trading that is 
generaUy accepted and followed by many authors. For example, Palomina (1996) used exactly the 
same OLG structure to derive the result that noise traders may eam higher expected utility than 
arbitrageurs in an imperfectly competitive market. 
8 That noisy traders rationally estimate the retum variance of risky asset is referred to as the 
assumption ofEqual Retum Volatilities OERV) by Bhushan. He showed that ERV restricts the 
parameter space of the model to a subset ofmeasure zero. See Bhushan (1997)，Proposition 4，p.34-35, 
in case of no fundamental risk; Proposition 8，p.39-40, in case offundamental risk. 
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traders on price volatility.^ In the presence of fundamental risk, up to three noisy 
equilibria with conflicting comparative statics may exist. Thus, Bhushan argued that 
noise trader risk could not be used to derive implications of regulatory policy such as 
transaction taxes for price volatility. 
In this paper, we analyze the overlapping generation model from the very 
beginning under a reaction approach.^ ® To make things simple, we follow De Long 
and Bhushan in considering that asset demands are affected by two factors only: 
expected return and return variance. Noise traders and arbitrageurs conduct trade 
based on their perceptions of risk and return. Arbitrageurs have rational expectation 
on risk and return, which in general would be a function of noise traders�expectation 
in a noisy equilibrium. We assume that noise traders�beliefs in risk and return are 
linear transformation of that of rational arbitrageurs: 
Noisy Expectation = a (Rational Expectation) + b, (3) 
where a and b are exogenous in this model. (3) is the reaction fonction of noisy 
traders in general form. We show that De Long and Bhushan assumed the same a and 
b in noise traders' expectation regarding retum, but difiFerent a and b in noise traders' 
expectation regarding risk. The linear relationship is designed to capture the fact that 
noise traders�beliefs are partly dependent on that of arbitrageurs and partly 
dependent on outside factor." Asset price at time t in equilibrium would be in the 
form of weighted average of expectations by noise traders and arbitrageurs: 
9 Bhushan called the structure that arbitrageurs with a short-horizon oflife may face risk from 
unpredictable beliefs of ftiture noise traders in time of selling their asset as myopic model. 
10 We caU this approach the reaction approach because, as we see later, equiUbrium in this paper is 
characterized by two sets ofreaction curves regarding risk and return perceived by investors 
respectively. 
u The assumption ofUnear transformation of expectations are by no means to restrict the parameter 
space in to a subset ofmeasure zero since, without loss of generality, nonlinear reaction of noise 
traders' expectation can be linear approximated in the nei^borhood of any equilibrium using 
techniques such as Taylor expansion. See Chiang (1984), p.254-267. 
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\weighted disturhance\ [weighted perceived return - weighted risk premium] Pt — I ‘ ‘ 1 + r [weighted discount factor 
(4) 
Thus, when the roles of sophisticated investors and noise traders are symmetric, 
arbitrageurs and noise traders cooperate in determining asset prices. From the first 
and second terms in (4), we can derive the effects of noise traders' beliefs on 
volatility and expected level of asset price respectively. In the following, we show 
that the weights for disturbance, perceived retum and risk premium are determined 
solely by investors�reactions over risk, whereas weighted discount factor is 
determined jointly by investors' reactions over risk and retum? Since the first term 
is only dependent on noise traders�reaction over risk, we can show that the true price 
variance is negatively related to noise traders' perceived retum variance relative to 
that of arbitrageurs. The exact effects ofnoise traders' expectations on expected price 
would only be determined after we have specified all parameters in noise traders' 
expectations. Nonetheless, it can be shown that if the difference in investors' 
perceived expected returns is an independent and identical (iid) process, expected 
price is negatively related to noise traders�relative perceived retum variance, given 
that either of the following conditions holds: 
Noise traders�expected retum are sufficiently high; (5a) 
Fundamental risk is sufficiently high. (5b) 
In the following, we introduce the basic assumptions of the OLG model in 
Chapter 2}^  In Chapter 3, we assume that there is no fundamental risk. We show that 
12 When we say‘ investor^ in this paper, we mean aU investors in the market; that is, both 
sophisticated investors and noise traders. 
13 The use of reaction approach is not confined to OLG framework only. It can be easily shown that 
this reaction approach can equaUy work in one-period or infinite horizon models. The OLG 
framework is chosen solely because De Long introduced the idea that noise trader risk causes 
excessive price volatility in an OLG model. 
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asset price is a weighted average of sophisticated investors' and noise traders' 
expectations in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 solves the equilibrium asset price in terms of 
investors�perceived risks and derives the idea that whether the price is noisy or not 
depends on investors' expectations regarding risk. We study equilibrium expected 
price and price variance in Section 3.3 and 3.4, and then show that both De Long�s 
and Bhushan's ideas are a special case of our model. In Section 3.5, we show that 
when perceived retum variance of noise traders relative to that of sophisticated 
investors rises, the price variance falls. Expected price falls if De Long's and 
Bhushan�s assumption that the difference in investors' expected returns is stochastic 
and (5a) hold. Chapter 4 deals with the case in which there is fundamental risk. 
Chapter 5 is conclusion and discussion/^ 
14 The reaction approach gives additional convenience for analysis. That is，most of the results in this 
paper can be illustrated by reaction diagrams. Nonetheless, we do suggest readers to have at least a 
brief elaboration on the Appendices since they provide intuitions, as well as detailed mathematical 
derivations of equations. 
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Chapter 2 
Assumptions for OLG Model 
This chapter lays out the traditional structure of an OLG model that is 
essentially the same as those used in De Long (1990a) and Bhushan (1997). For 
simplicity, we Hst these assumptions in table form. 
2.1 Assumption A 
(a) People live for two periods. They receive an endowment of w and make 
investment during the 1^  period; then, they consume aU wealth in the 2"^  period. 
(b) There are one riskless asset and one risky asset. The riskless asset is in perfectly 
elastic supply with dividend of r and price of 1; the risky asset is in perfectly 
inelastic supply of 1 with dividend of d^  and price of p” 
(c) The utility function is U = -e^; where c is the 2°^  period consumption and y is an 
index of absolute risk aversion. If c follows normal distribution, investors 
maximize their linear mean-variance approximation certainty equivalent: 
CE = Expected a> - ya®^ , (6) 
where co is the 2°^  period wealth of investors. 
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(d.) There are two types of investors: rational arbitrageurs (i) with a population of 
(l-u), and noise traders (n) with a population of u. i and n perceive the expected 
retums (i.e. the next-period asset price plus dividend, tPt+i+A+i) to be A and B 
respectively; whereas they expect the price variances to be C and D 
respectively/^ 
(d)Assuming the process of dividends to be d^  �"d N(d, X). For the case of no 
fundamental risk, we have X 二 0. With fundamental risk, we have X > 0. 
Note that (a) allows the ignorance of labor-leisure and consumption-saving 
decisions altogether since investors receive an exogenous endowment of w in 1^  
period and consume only in 2"^  period. The riskless asset in (b) acts as numeraire in 
the model and r is the riskfree interest rate at which investors can borrow and lend an 
infmite amount of money. The assumption of normally distributed retum in (c) is a 
standard device to derive the risk premium and make the linear mean-variance 
approximation objective function exact. We may consider alternative distributions of 
retum (e.g. lognormal distribution) if we assume (6) as the objective fonction at the 
very beginning. 
15 We may alternatively say that i perceives (pt+i+dt+i)-"^ NT(A, C); 
whereas n perceives (pt+i+dt+i)~"^ N(B, D). 
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Chapter 3 
Equilibrium Conditions Without Fundamental 
Risk 
Throughout Chapter 3 we assume that there is no fundamental risk, so return 
variance is equal to price variance.^ ^ Price of the risky asset (pO is equal to (1) Vt in 
the classical equilibrium since d^  = d Vt in case of no fiindamental risk. In Section 
3.1, we show that price is a weighted average of i s and n s beliefs. In Section 3.2, 
we will solve the values of A and B when C and D are treated as constants. In 
Section 3.3, we show that i�s rational expectation on price variance defines a relation 
between C and D, whereas in Section 3.4, we show that n s expectation on price 
variance defines another relation between C and D. We show that both DeLong�s and 
Bhushan�s models are a special case of our model with different restrictions on n�s 
expectation. In Section 3.5, we derive the effect o f D rising relative to C on price 
variance and expected price level. 
3.1 Price as a Weighted Average 
Let i�s and n s demands for risky asset = A/ and X^ respectively. Given that i 
and n perceive (expected retum, price variance) to be (A, C) and (B, D) respectively, 
16 Qr we can say that, since dt=d Vt, VaTt(pt+i+dt+i) = VaTt(pt+i) Vt. 
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the objective fimctions (6) are: 
CEi = (l+r)w + [A-(l+r)pjr - yC{Vf', (7a) 
CE„ = (l+r)w + [B-(l+r)pjr • yD(A,")^  (7b) 
Investors choose their Xs to maximize their CEs given their beliefs. Differentiating 
(7a) and (7b) with respect to X, we have: 
;i, = J - ( l + ^ , ; 
2yC 
又 、 忍 - ( 1 + 0 “  
2yD 
Supply of the risky asset is fixed at 1. The market clearing condition is then: 
u T + (l-u)A<i=l, (9) 
Given (8a), (8b) and (9)，we have: 
p, - : ; J - | a 5 + ( l - a ) ^ - 2 y f - l l (10) where a = ^ f . 
1 + r [ V w J\ uC + (1 - u)D 
Appendix One shows the derivation and intuition of (10). From that, we have the 
foUowing proposition: 
Proposition One Asset Price = Weighted Average (X = 0) 
Given assumption A and the absence of fimdamental risk, the roles of i and n 
are symmetric in the sense that price of the risky asset is a weighted average of their 
beliefs in risk and retum. From (10), asset price is equal to the difference between the 
(aD^ 
weighted expected retum, [aB + (l-a)A] and weighted risk premium, 2y ——， V w ； 
discounted at the riskfi*ee interest rate. 
a measures the rektive influence of n in the market, it therefore is of utmost 
importance in this paper since we aim to study the effect of n s beUefe on price. 
17 From tiie demand fimctians (8a) and (8b)，investors raise their demands as their perceived expected 
returns (i.e. A and B) rises and/or as their perceived price risk (i.e. C and D) falls. 
18 We may consider u and (l-u) respectively as the ratios of the number of i and n to the asset supply 
• I 
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When the number of n (i.e. u) rises, their influence on the market rises; when n 
perceive that there is increasing price risk (i.e. D rises), they reduce their positions in 
the risky asset so their influence on the market falls. It will be shown at the end of 
Section 3.2 that whether price is equal to the fixndamental value, whether a unique 
equilibrium exists, and whether unpredictability of n s beliefs causes excessive price 
volatility depends solely on the value of a. 
Since we have not yet imposed rational expectations on (A，C) and noisy 
expectations on (C, D) respectively, Proposition One is a general pricing function in 
the absence of fixndamental risk. It says that asset price is generally a weighted 
average of beliefs when there are two groups of homogenous investors and each 
group have different expectations regarding expected retum and return variance. 
When the two groups are identified as noise traders and arbitrageurs, asset price is 
generally a weighted average of noisy and rational expectations. Though we have not 
yet reached a conclusion, simple intuition would indicate that classical equilibrium 
can only be attained as a comer solution. This is indeed true in our mode^ as we can 
see later. 
3.2 Determination of A and B 
The values of A, B, C and D in (10) are endogenous variables. The values of 
A and C are endogenously determined by i�s rational expectations on expected retum 
and price variance, whereas the values of B and D are determined by n s noisy 
expectations which are not yet defined. To specify i s and n�s expectations in a 
formal statement, we make the foUowing assumptions. 
(Q) since: uX° + (l-u)X,' = 1 is eqmvalent to (number ofn)V + (number of i)A^=Q. 
12 
3.2.1 Assumption B 
(a) i have rational expectations on risk and return. Accordingly: 
A = (tPt+i+A+i), i.e. rational expectation expected return; (lla) 
C = VaTt(pt+i), i.e. rational expectation price variance. (llb) 
(b) n have noisy expectations on risk and return. According to (3)，B and D are a 
Unear transformation of A and C respectively: 
B = a!A + bi; 
D = a2C + b2.'' 
FoUowing De Long, we investigate the case in which the unpredictability of n s 
expected return causes excessive price volatility. Therefore, we assume bj to be 
stochastic: 
bu = e,, where Ct-"'N(e*, cP), e*>0.'° 
Hence, n s expectations are represented by: 
Bt = a,A + e” where e^  -"^ N(e*，a"); 
B* = a!A + e* (12a)  
D==a2C + V i 0 ^  
To justify (12a) and (12b)，we may consider that n try to leam the information 
19 Wheti either a!本 1 OT bi 本 0，n'sperceived expected return is biased. When either ^ 本 1 or bj 本 0, 
n � s perceived return variance is biased, a! and % measures the response ofB and D to change in A and 
C respectively, b! and b2 are exogenous variable in B and D that are indepaident of A and C 
respectively. 
20 Following De Long and Bhushan, we assume that n is bulUsh on average in the sense that they 
overestimate the expected retum, i.e. e* > 0. 
2iperceived return distribution by i at time t is: (pt+i+dt+i)~"^^(A, C); 
A^^ereas perceived return distribution by n at time t is: (pt+i+dt+i)r"^N(aiA + e^ a2C + b2). 
While return distribution perceived by i is the same for all generations, each generation of n perceives 
a different return distribution. 
i 
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o f A and C independently from i，but make errors in the process of learning. In this 
manner, the values o f a ” 化，bj and b2 are exogenous and independent in the model to 
aUow highest degree ofgenerality.^^ Alternatively, Bhushan (1997) used a structural 
form model to justify the independence among a!，化，�and 1¾. The same idea can be 
used in this paper as well^ Other possibilities in the way how n form their 
expectations regarding risk and retum are also allowed, but they may impose 
restrictions on the values of ^ and/or t>i, The reaction approach of asset pricing can 
be used to derive the implications of all possible assumptions. 
In the following, we apply Assumption B step by step to solve the model. We 
use (lla) to define the RE Une in Section 3.2.2. Then, we add (12a) into the RE Une 
in order to calculate the equilibrium values of A and B conditional on C and D in 
Section 3.2.3.^ ^ We use (llb) in Section 3.3 to derive the value of C conditional on D 
and finally, we use (12b) in Section 3.4 to solve the value ofD. 
3.2.2 RE Line and NE Line 
In this part we solve for the reaction of i�s perceived expected retum (A), to 
n s perceived expected retum (B). In doing so, we assume temporarily that i perceive 
B = BtWith mean B*. Then, (10) becomes: 
^ ^ + + | f 4 (13) 1 + r l + r [ V w )} 
Comparing (13) to (8), we can see that once we assume B = Bt with mean B*, we 
^ Existence of equilibrium does need some restrictions on 年 and bj, as showed later. 
^ Accordingly, n have make two kinds oferrors: errors in (i) forecasting et and (ii) forecasting the 
rehtimship between pt and e^ See Bhushan (1997), p.30-31. 
24 For example, we may consider the case that n make error in every element of retum distribution. 
Accordingly, we assume that i correctly estimates the k^ element to be (pt+i+dt+i)^  but n misperceives 
it to be a(pt+i+dt+i/ + b Vk in retum distribution. Li this case, a! = a, & = a^ , bj = b, and b2 = 0. 
25 Whenever we say that a variable is conditional on C and D, we mean that the values of C, D, and a 
are treated as constant during calculation. 
i 
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have introduced disturbance (i.e. De Long's noise traders' risk) into the OLG 
model.26 Applying (lOa) in Assumption B to the model, it can be easily showed that: 
广 f \^  
A = -^laB*+{l-d)d-2y[-^ + d. (14) r+a Vu y 
V 乂 
See Appendix Two. 
(14) defines rational expectation expected retum of i (A) as a function of 
noisy expectation expected retum of n (B*); we call it the RE Hne. Similarly, (12a) 
defines noisy expectation expected retum of n (Bj and B*) as a fiinction of rational 
expectation expected retum of i (A), we call it the NE line. Intersection of RE line 
and NE line gives the equilibrium values of A and B ? 
3.2.3 Equilibrium values of A and B 
In this part we solve for the values of A and B in terms of C and D by adding 
(12a) into (14). It can be showed that the equilibrium price conditional on C and D is: 
广 , 、， 
Pt = « ( � , -�— — L _ L e * ^ [ { \ - a ) + axi,\i-ly\ — \\, (15) \ + r r + a - aa^ [ v u )\ 
From which we can get the values of A and B: 
1 f , f aD\\ A=——-——\ae*+[(l-a) + aa,}i-2y — \ + d; (16a) r + a - aa^ [ v u / 
< 1 V ToDYl 
B*^a^ <ae*+^-a)^-aa^^-2y ——[ + e*; (16b) 
(^ r + a - o o f J [ ^ u )] 
26 De Long introduced noise traders' risk into the OLG model by assuming that n has a stochastic 
perceived expected retum (i.e. B = Btwith mean B*). Theoretically, we can extend the model by 
assuming that n has a stochastic perceived price variance too (i.e. D = D^with mean D*). However, we 
need to adjust the objective fimction of (6) to a higher degree so as to reflect the fact that there is risk 
ofchanging risk premium. This would undoubtedly complicate our work substantiaUy. 
27 We may regard (14) and (12a) as the reaction curves of two investors and the intersection as the 
Nash EquiUhrium in game theory in the sense that the roles of i and n are symmetric. However, 
reaction approach in this paper differs to game theory in that (i) the two parties are price-takers in a 
perfectly competitive asset market; (ii) they have different reaction curves according to their beliefe in 
risk and retum; (iii) intersection point detennines perceived expected returns, rather that price or 
quantity, ofthe two parties. 
i 
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f 1 V faD\ 
B=a, \ae*+[{\-a) + aja,\i-2Y — ) + e,, (16c) 
y r + a - a a , ) { V « ；] 
See Appendix Three for derivations of (15)，(16a), (16b) and (16c). 
Equilibrium values of A and B exist in as long as (r+ a-aa^ 本 0. Along the 
tZB* r + a 
RE Une in (14)，we can see that = ； along the NE line in (12a), we get dA a 
dB * 
=«1. Therefore, equilibrium exists if the slope ofRE and NE is different (i.e. dA 
they have intersection point). See Figure One for graphical interpretation. 
From (15), price converges to the classical equiUbrium of (1) when a = 0， 
otherwise, price is noisy. Therefore, whether asset price is noisy or equal to the 
fimdamental value depending on whether a is bigger than zero or not. In addition, 
whether there is no, unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria of p^  depends on 
whether there is no, unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria of a. Recall that a is 
defined by C and D. As we will show later, C can be endogenously determined as a 
function o f D by i � s rational expectation of price variance according to (llb) in 
Assumption B, Hence, we have the foUowing proposition: 
Proposition Two EquiUbrium is determined by a QL = 0) 
Given Assumption A, (lla) and (12a)，as well as the absence of fundamental 
risk, whether there is classical or noisy equilibrium and whether there is no, unique 
or multiple equilibria depends on the value of a，which in tum is depending on 
perceived price variance of investors. Since sophisticated investors�perceived price 
variance is endogenously determined by rational expectation, specification of noise 
traders�perceived price variance determines the nature of equilibrium price.  
j 
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3.3 Rational Expectation on Price Variance (RV Line) 
In this section we solve for the value of C as a fiinction o f D according to i s 
rational expectation on price variance which is specified by (llb) in Assumption B. 
From (15), rational expectation price variance, C, is given by: 
C = - ^ c T ^ 二 [ > ^ ？ ^ > ^ T - ^ . (17) 
(l + r)2 [wC + (l-w)Z)J (l + r)2 
(17) is a third degree equation in C which defines the C as a relation to D. Upon 
factorization and restricting the values of C and D to be non-negative, we get: 
(C, D) = (0, (0, cx)]); and (18a) 
^ " ' ^ ^ = f ' w l f c M ^ T T 7 - 4 (卿 
Appendix Four shows the derivations of(18a) and (18b). We call (18a) and (18b) the 
RV Une, which defmes the rational expectation price variance, C, as a relation to the 
noisy expectation price variance, D. In Figure Two, we draw the RV Hne and 
^ 2 
illustrate how it shifts when u and change. 
(l + r)2 
The RV line is divided into two sections: (18a) and (18b). When the NV line, 
which defmes another relation between C and D, is imposed, we reach the reduced 
form equilibrium that depends on only exogenous variables. When NV intersects the 
1^  section ofRV, we obtain classical equilibrium of (1); when NV intersects the 2°^  
section of RV, we obtain noisy equilibrium. In the same logic, when NV intersects 
RV once, we have unique equilibrium; when NV intersects RV twice or more, we 
have multiple equilibria. Finally, when NV does not intersect RV, there is no 
equilibrium. We illustrate these ideas in the following cases: 
i 
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Case One: When NV cuts RV at C 二 0 and D > 0 
In this case, a = " � = 0； from (13) and (15), p, = - ^ = — . uC + (l-u)D l + r r 
Classical equilibrium of( l ) is attained. By (8b)，A"=石,~^^^^^' a^d i is willing 2yD 
jl 
to trade at an infinite amount in order to keep the price at p^  = - — — . B y market 
l + r 
1 — ii)^ 
clearing condition of (9): X = — . (19a) 
Case Two: When NV cuts RV at C > 0 and D > 0 
In this case, a : — > 0 ； p^  is given by (15). Noisy equilibrium is 
wC + (l-w)Z) 
attained. By (8a) and (8b),人° and V is finite. 
Case Three: When NV cuts RV at C 二 D = 0 
In this case, a is not defined; from (15), equilibrium price not exists. By (8a) 
and (8b)，both i and n are willing to trade at an infinite amount in order to keep the 
price at p, = - ^ a n d ^ ^ respectively. 
P , ' l + r l + r 
Case Four: WhenNVcuts RV at C > 0 and D = 0 
B c — € * € * +Q d 
In this case, a = 1; from (13) and (15), p . =~~— = — + • 
l + r l + r l + r - a j 
^ 一（1 + r ) p 
Noisy equiHbrium is attained. By (8a)，A'=——-———and n is willing to trade at 
2yC u 
an infinite amount in order to keep the price at p^  = j ^ . By market clearing 
conditionof(9): 久„=1-(1-")义' (i9b) u 
Graphical Interpretation for the four cases is provided in Figure Three. For 
illustration, we assume B^  = B > A. 
] 
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3.4 Noisy Expectation on Price Variance QW line) 
From Section 3.3，we know that i s rational expectation on price variance 
defines a RV line which is a relation between C and D. Since roles of i and n are 
symmetric in this paper, n s noisy expectation on price variance would defines 
another relation between C and D, and we call it the NV line，which we have akeady 
specified to be (12b). Intersection of RV and NV Unes then determines the 
equilibrium values o f C and D. From (12b)，the NV Une is D =化。+ bj, where % and 
t>2 are the slope and intercept of the NV Hne. Depending on the values of % and b2, 
we can have different intersection points in the RV-NV diagram and hence different 
equilibrium values of C and D. We illustrate this idea in Figure Four. 
Once the values of C and D are determined, we can solve for the value of a, 
and then the equilibrium price. This can be accomplished by two methods: 
Method One 
The complete model can be summarized by (12a)，(12b), (14)，(18a, b)，and (13). 
(12a) and (14) are reaction curves in the RE-NE diagram, from which we can 
determine investors' perceived expected returns (A and B); (12b) and (18a, b) are 
reaction curves in the RV-NV diagram from which we can determine investors' 
perceived price variances (C and D). Substituting the resulting values o f A , B, C, and 
D into (13), we obtain the equilibrium price of the risky asset in reduced form. 
Method Two 
The conq>lete model can be summarized by (12b), (18a, b) and (15). As before, (12b) 
and (18a, b) gives equilibrium values of C and D. Substituting into (15), we obtain 
1 
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the equilibrium asset price in reduced f o r m . 
In the foUowing two sub-sections, we show that both De Long's and 
Bhushan^s models are special cases of the reaction approach, with the same 
specification in (12a) but different specifications in (12b). 
3A1 DeLong�sModel 
De Long assumes that the difference between i�s and n s expected retums is 
an independently and identically distributed process. In addition, he assumes that 
perceived price variances are the same for i and n. Hence, he implicitly assumes the 
values ofai, % and b2 in (12a) and (12b) respectively to be: 
a1 = l;a2=l;b2 = O. (20a) 
Substituting (20a) into (12a) and (12b)，Noisy Expectations of n are represented by 
the reaction fimctions of: 
Bt = A + e” where e^  〜似 N(e*, a^); 
B * = A + e*; (21a) 
D = C. (21b) 
(i) Equilibrium price 
From either Method (A) or (B)，we can show that asset price, price variance 
and expected price (p) are respectively: 
u(e, - e*) 1�女,^ w2<j2 Pt =~V~~"- + - ue*^d-2y-~~^ ； (22) 1 + r r (l + r)^ 
28 Recall from Section 3.2.3 that (15) is the equilibrium price conditional of C and D, which is derived 
from substitution between (12a)，（14) and (13). Therefore, (15) is a price function that encompasses 
the equilibrium values of A and B from RE and NE. Method Two is then theoretically the same as the 
Method Qne but mathematically easier. 
i 
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' - 吞 一 ； (23) 
p = - ue*+d-2y^^ . (24) 
4 ( 1 + 广 ) _ 
See Appendix Five for the derivations of(22), (23) and (24). 
Existence ofiuiique noisy equilibrium of (22) in De Longs model is a direct 
result of(21b), which specifies the NV line to be C = D. We illustrate this idea in 
Figure Five. 
(ii) Effect of Increasing u 
De Long studied the effect of increase in the number of noise traders on the 
dc 
variance of retum (i.e.—)• From (23), this effect is positive. We show this du 
argument graphically in Figure Six. Like the existence of unique noisy equilibrium, 
dc 
the fact that ——> 0 in De Long's model is a direct result of (21b). du 
(iii) (21b)本 n has rational expectation 
Note that imposition ofDe Long's NV line not only means that n has rational 
expectation on retum variance, but also that n s and i�s perceived retum variances are 
identical. There are multiple equilibria even ifboth i and n have rational expectations, 
dC 
with ——> 0 in one equilibrium only. We show the idea in Figure Seven. In this du 
manner, De Long not only assumes rational expectations of i and n, but also identity 




3.4.2 Bhushans Model 
Like De Long, Bhushan also assumes that the difference between i s and n � s 
expected retums is an independently and identically distributed process. Unlike De 
Long, he assumes that n s and i s perceived price variances are independent. 
Therefore，he implicitly assumes the values of a!，4 and 1¾ in (12a) and (12b) 
respectively to be: 
ai = 1 ； 32 = 0; 1¾ = an exogenous variable. (20b) 
Substituting (20b) into (12a) and (12b)，Noisy Expectations of n are then represented 
by the reaction fiinctions of: 
Bt = A + e" where e^  -"^ N(e*，o )^; 
B* = A + e*; (21a) 
D = t>2. (21c) 
A direct result of(21c) is a horizontal NV Une in Bhushan's model. Together 
with the RV Une, we can see that classical equilibrium always exists. In addition, 
there can be up to two noisy equilibria, depending on the value of bj. For small but 
I 
positive b2, we have one classical equilibrium and two noisy equilibria; for large b2, ； 
we have only classical equilibrium. Derivation of reduced form equilibrium price in 
Bhushans model is laborious; instead, we illustrate the idea graphically in Figure 
Eight. 
(i) Comparison with De Long 
Bhushan showed that his model is a generalization of De Long's model in 
considering that C and D are different. According to Bhushan, if C 本 D in De Long's 
model, equilibrium price in De Long's model converges to that in Bhushan's model; 




converges to that in De Long�s model.^ ^ In fact, if we assumes D = b^ = (!+ )2 , we 
can construct a model in which De Long's unique noisy equilibrium is equal to one 
ofthe multiple equilibria in Bhushan�s model?�In this case, asset prices and price 
variances in the three equilibria are respectively: 
C = 0, C = ^ ^ and C 二 (^一“)? • (25a), (25b)，(25c) 
(l+,)2 (1+尸) 
Pr=-； (26a) r 
= ^ ^ ^ 斗 * + 厂 ^ ; (26b) 1 + r r (l + r)_ 
A = ( l - , - - ) + 4 ( l - " ) A " y ^ ^ 1 . (26c) 
1 + r r (1 + r) 
Appendix Six shows the derivations of (25a, b, c) and (26a, b, c) 
For (26a), expected price is the same as asset price; for (26b) and (26c)， 
expected prices are the same as asset prices when (Cj- e*) is set equal to zero, (26a) 
represents ckssical equilibrium of (1); whereas (26b) and (26c) represent two noisy 
equilibria. We compare Bhushans multiple equilibria to De Long's unique noisy 
I ^,2 2 w o^  
equilibrium under the assumption of D - b^ =————graphically in Figure Nine. 
(ii) Effect ofIncreasing u 
Effect of increase in the number of noise traders on price variance in 
Bhushan's model is not as clear as that in De Long's model. The possibility of 
dc 
multiple equilibria is the key reason why it is difficult to study ——in Bhushan du 
^ See Bhushan (1997), Proposition 3，p.33. 
30 Moreover, De Long'sunique equilibrium is constantly equals to one of the Bhushan's multiple 




model. In the classical equilibrium, — = 0，since C is always equal to zero. In the 
noisy equilibria, things are more complicated. In some circumstances, noisy 
equilibrium may even feil to exist when u increases. We may skip this problem by 
assuming the existence of noisy equilibria before and after u increases, and this is 
what Bhushan did. He argued that in general there are conflicting comparative statics 
between the two noisy equilibria. We show this idea graphically in Figure Ten. I fwe 
2 2 1 
assumes D = b) 二 - , two noisy equilibria exist except in the case o f u = - • 
(l + r) 2 
Like the case where D is independent of u, we have conflicting comparative statics; 
unlike that case, n s perceived price variance rises as u rises. See Figure Eleven for 
graphical illustration. i 
！ I 
By now, we can summarize Section 3.4 in the foUowing proposition: ^   
— I 
Proposition Three 
De Long s and Bhushan s ModeLs are Special Cases Qi = 0) 
I 
Given Assumption A & B and the absence of fiindamental risk, both De Long's and 
Bhushans models are a special case of our model in the sense that n s expectation is | 
a Unear transformation of i � s expectation. De Long and Bhushan assume the same ‘ 
NE, the perceived expected retum of n as a function of that of i, but they assume 
different NVs, the perceived price variance of n as a fimction of that ofi.  
3.5 Change in Relative Perceived Price Variance 
3.5.1 General Problem of OLG Model in Noisy Trading 
Without exact specification of n's expectation, we may have no, unique or 




changes in u and • The problem is that we dori t have generally agreed 
(l + r)2 
values ofai,化，bj and 1¾. As seen before, we may not have unique equilibrium price 
at the very beginning. Different values of % and b2 results in different values of C 
and D，as Ulustrated by comparison between De Long's and Bhushan�s models. In 
addition, some combination 0fa2 and b2 may lead to multiple equilibria, and we don�t 
have generally agreed criterion in choosing among them, as illustrated by Bhushan�s 
model. The final outcome is that we cannot reach an identical conclusion on the 
effect of increase in the number ofnoise traders. Graphically, as u increases, the RV 
i 
line shifts up, the intersection point o fRV and NV lines moves along the NV line, 






3.5.2 Change inNoise Traders^ Beliefs | 
I 
The same problem emerges as we study the effect of change in noise traders� j 
beliefs. Nonetheless, we could imagine graphicaUy what would happen when there is 
changes in n s expectations. The sources of changes can be distinguished into two 
kinds: change in n s perceived expected return and change in n s perceived price : 
variance. 
(i) Change in n s Perceived Expected Return 
Change in n s perceived e jected return refers to change in the values of a^  
and/or bi, and thus shift of NE Une. The intersection point in Figure One moves 
along the RE line. Since slope and intercept ofRE Une depends on the values of C 
and D, and thus the NV Une, we cannot reach a unanimous outcome without 
specifying an arbitrary NV Une. 
i 
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(ii) Change in n�s Perceived Price Variance 
Similarly, change in n s perceived price variance refers to change in the 
values 0fa2 andA)r、，and thus shift ofNV line. The intersection point in Figure Four 
then moves along the RV line. Change in price variance in turn causes shift of RE 
line, and thus the intersection point in Figure One moves along the NE line. Again, 
effect on expected price is not unanimous before we specify an arbitrary NE Hne. In 
the foUowing, we show that when the relative perceived price variance of noise 
traders increases, the price variance decreases, but the effect on price level is not 
I ！ 
clear. ； 
3.5.3 Relative Perceived Price Variance of n, 6 
i ( £ ) � i 
Define the ratio ofD to C as 0 Le, 9 = — . We would show that when 0 rises, | V CJ ‘ 
'i 
c falls. Note that any given equilibrium values of C and D from any NV Une have a ‘ 
unique 0. ln De Longs mode^ 0 is constantly equal to 1, since the NV Une is C = D; 
while in Bhushans model, each of the multiple equilibria have a unique 0, as 




This section studies the effect of increase in noise traders' relative perceived 
price variance. In De Long's model, we cannot study the effect of increasing 0 since 
9 = 1 always holds; while in Bhushan's model, we have multiple equilibria so we 
dont have unique effect ofincreasing 0. By specifying a given value of0 and raising 
this value a little bit, we couki bypass the problems of fixed 0 and multiple 0. In this 
manner, we normalize the NV line into D = 0C, and the changes in ^ and b2 into 
change in 0 in the neighborhood of any given equilibrium. 
i 
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dC 3.5.3.1 Effect of9 increase on price variance,— cPd 
Substituting — = 0 into a, we have: c 
a = ~ ~ & ~ ~ = ~ ~ - ~ ~ " . (27) uC + (l-u)D u + (l-u)0 
From (27), we can see that the derivative of a with respect to 0 is: 
^ = _ _ 0 - ^ > ^ J h J L ] a ^ < o , (28) 
de [u+{i-u)ef K “ J 
Therefore，as 0 rises, a M s . Substituting (28) into (17)，we have: 
C = ^ 2 g 2 = r u T j 2 
(l + r)2 L" + (l_">^J (l + r)2 
Differentiating (29) with respect to 9, we have: 
dC dCda 2acr'厂 f l -w) 2l 2(l-^>xV^ . . —二 = - a = ；~~. (juj 
dO dadO (l + r f l V ^ J � M(l+r)2 dC 
From (30), we can see that as 9 rises, C falls; in other words, — < 0. In addition, as uu 





Graphically, 0 defines the slope of a straight Une that goes through the origin I 
and a point in the RV Une. When 0 rises, the slope of this straight Une increases. As [ 
shown in Figure Thirteen, C falls as a result. Therefore, we have Proposition Four: 
Proposition Four Price Variance is decreasing in 0 (X = 0) 
Given Assumption A & B and the absence of fundamental risk, when n s 
relative perceived price variance rises, the true price variance falls, and vice versa. In 
addition, this negative relation between n s relative perceived price variance and true 
price variance diminishes as the former rises.  
dC 
The reason for — < 0 can be understood as foUows. Interpreting a as d0 
i 
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relative influence ofn in the market. When n s relative perceived price variance rises, 
they perceived that trading the risky asset involves increasing risk, so they reduce 
their positions in the market.^ ^ As n hold decreasing positions, the extent in which 
noise affects price or noise traders�risk causes excessive price volatility is reduced. 
As a result, noise-generated price variance falls. In the limit, n effectively disappears 
dC 
from the market, so — ^ 0 • du 
3.5.3.2 Effect ofIncreasing 0 on Expected Price Level, ^ 
(a.) Uncertainty in 字 
dQ 
From (27), we know that when 0 rises, a falls. Recall from (10) and (13) that 
a(5 -B*) 丨 
price level is equal to the sum of a discounted disturbance, — j ^ — , and a | 
discounted difference between expected return, [aB* + (l-a)A], and risk premium, 
2 y ( - ) . Expected return is determined by RE and NE (i.e. (14) and (12a)). In u Y + a 
Figure One, slope ofRE line is • When 0 rises, slope ofRE Hne rises. The , a 
intersection point ofRE and NE then moves along the NE line. Depending on the j 
values of a! and e*，we can have different effects of 0 increase on A and B*. In this 
manner, the effect of6 increase on expected price level is uncertain. Figure Fourteen 
illustrates how we achieve different outcomes when different NE lines are imposed. 
(b.) ^ when(21a)holds d^ 
Ifthe NE line is specified, we can work out the effect of increasing 0 on price 
level. For illustration, we follow De Long and Bhushan in assuming that a! = 1 and 
31 That means, when n have long (short) the asset, they reduce their long (short) positions. 
i 
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e* is a positive parameter. In this case, the NE line in (12a) becomes (21a): B* 二 A + 
e”2 
Substituting (21a) into (15), we have: 
a(e,-e^) 1 �… . f o D V p. = - ^ - + - ae*^d-2y —— 
尸, 1 + r r [ ^ u )_ 
d^ (e,-e^ I 它*) 2y(aD^ . 
= — + a — + — . ( j i ) 
r �1 + r r J r �u j 
From (31)，effect on price level is depending on the relative change of 
J ^ t ~^*^£^1 and ^ f - l . To get rid ofthe period-to-period fluctuation，we V 1 + r r ) r V u j 
study instead the effect on expected price level, p: 
d ae* 2y(aD^ , ” � 
p = — + • (32) i 
r r r �u ； | 
da I 
The second term of (32) falls as 0 rises since ~ ^ < 0 • The effect on third term, the ^ 
d6 i； ‘ 
risk premium, however, is more complicated, since D is a nonlinear fimction of0. As 
2y (aD^ . 
shown in Figure Fifteen, when 6 increases continuously from 0 to 00， rises 
r V u y I 
from 0 at first and falls to 0 finally. | 
丨  
j i 
It can be shown that the effect of 0 on p is depending on whether the 
following condition holds for aU 学: 
, * > 判 1 + 碑 . (33) 
u � D da y 
Appendix Seven shows that if (33) holds, the effect of increasing 0 on p is 
, A . , . ^ dD dDdO ..各 
continuously negative. Note that as 0 nses, the sign of — = — — is rirst 
negative and then positive. Thus, there may be non-linear relationship between p and 
32 That El = 1 simplifies our work substantiaUy, since the weighted discounted factor in (4) and (15) is 
reduced to r. 
i 
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0 ife* is small, as we show below. 
f 2^2 \ 
Substituting D = 6C = e -~~^ into(32),wehave: U i + ” J 
l � j . lyaO( a 2 g 2 ^ ] p = - d + ae^-~-~" - ~ ~ ^ . (34) r [ w ( (1 + 广)人 
From (34)，we can show that the Umited expected price when 0 •> 0 and 0 ^ 00 are 
respectively: p ~> &+: ； (35) 
p ^ - . (36) r 
Therefore, when 9 — 00, p ~> (36)，which is the classical equilibrium of (1). 
i i i 
According to (34)，the derivative ofp with respect to 0 is: I i I 
± = { - ^ [ f l ^ V - l la 2 - (1 - ^). 4 — • (37) i 
de [(l + r)'Ll, u j J ru | 
I 
The 1^  term in {...} of (37) is first negative and then positive as 0 rises. The 丨 I i 
implication from (37) is that ife* is large, {• •.} is negative for all values of0; thus p I 
is constantly decreasing in 0. See Appendix Eight for the derivations and ‘ 
interpretations of (35), (36) and (37). See Figure Sixteen for graphical illustration. 
We could summarize the idea in the following proposition: 
Proposition Five Expected Price may decrease in 0 (X = 0) 
Given Assumption A & B，the absence of fimdamental risk, and that the 
difference between n s and f s perceived expected retums is an iid process (i.e. De 
Long�s or Bhushans NE holds), i fn is not very bullish (i.e. e* is small), expected 
price level is first decreasing, then increasing, and finally decreasing in 9 (n's 
relative perceived price risk). I fn is sufficiently bullish (i.e. e* is sufficiently large), 
i 
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expected price level is continuously decreasing in 0. In both cases, expected price 
converges to the classical equilibrium of (1) as Q rises to infinity.  
Intuition ofProposition Five is as follows. Increase in n s relative perceived 
price variance causes decrease in their willingness to trade. The effects on expected 
price can be divided into three components. Firstly, the weight of n in expected 
retum falls, which causes decrease in weighted expected retum to the extent that e* 
is positive (n overestimate expected retum); it�s effect on expected price is (-). 
I 
Secondly, i s perceived price risk (i.e. C) falls since there is decreasing noise traders� 
risk in the market (i.e. because n s demands fells), and so weighted risk premium 
tends to fall; it has (+)effect on expected price. Thirdly, n s perceived price risk (i.e. i i 
D) rises at first and faUs later, and it tends to change the weighted risk premium in j 
the same direction; i f s effect on price is (-, +)• Total effect of rise in 0 on expected | 
price depends on the rektive strengths of these three components. If n is very bullish 
I 
(i.e. e* is large), the (-) effect ofweighted expected retum dominates the (-，+) effect 
ofweighted risk premium; the net effect of on expected price is (-)• On the contrary, | 
if n is not very bullish, the (-) effect of weighted expected retum is dominated by the ‘ 
4 
(-，+) effect ofweighted risk premium initially, though it dominates the (-, +) effect in 
the end; the net effect of on expected price is thus (-，+，-). 
Finally, as n s rektive perceived price risk rises to an extremely high level (i.e. 
e is close to infmity), their positions is close to 0. In essence, n disappears from the 




Equilibrium Conditions With Fundamental 
Risk 
We will study the case where there is fundamental risk in this c h a p t e r . We 
assume that i and n perceive this fundamental risk as X and Y r e s p e c t i v e l y ^ Basing 
on Assumption B and thus the market clearing condition of (9), we derive the 
equilibrium price in the presence of fundamental risk in the following sections. In 
Section 4.1, we show that price is a weighted average of i � s and n s beliefs. In 
Section 4.2, we will solve the values of A and B. In Section 4.3，we show that i�s ； 
I 
I 
rational expectation on return variance defines a relation between (C+X) and (D+Y). 
In Section 4.4, we show that n s expectation on price variance defines another ！ 
I 
relation between (C+X) and ^>+Y) and show that both De Long�s and Bhushan�s 
models are a special case ofour model with different restrictions on n s expectation. 
m Section 4.5, we show that when (D+Y) rises rektive to (C+X), (C+X) faUs, and if ‘ 
the difference in investors' expected return is an iid, expected price level falls when 
(5a) or (5b) holds. In Section 4.6，we consider the cases when D rises relative to C 
and when Y rises relative to X separately. 
33 By fimdamental risk, we means that there is positive variance ofdividend, i.e. Vart(dt+j) = X > 0 V j 
>0. 
^ Both De Long and Bhushan assumes that both i and n correctly estimate the variance ofdividaid 
(i.e. X = Y) in the case ofpositive fundamental risk. This paper considers the more realistic case that 
iie two parties may have different expectations on dividend variance. However, most ofthe 
conclusions in Chapter 4 do not depend on this assumption. 
i 
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4.1 Price as a Weighted Average 
Since there is fundamental risk, retum variance is equal to the variance of 
price plus dividend. Assuming that price and dividend are independently distributed, 
retum variance is the sum ofprice variance and dividend variance, (C+X), i and n 
maximize their objective functions based on their expectations on risk and retum.^ ^ 
The objective functions (6) perceived by i and n are respectively: 
CEi = (l+r)w + [A-(l+r)pJV _ y(C+X)(Vf; (38a) 
CE„ = (l+r)w + P-(l+r)pJ r - y(D+Y)(r)l (38b) 
When i and n maximize their CEj, their demands for risky asset ( X ) are respectively: 
= J - ( l + r)A 
2r(C + X) 
又 ” = [ ( 崎 、 (39b) 
2y(D + Y) : 
By the market clearing condition of (9)，we can easily show that: 
^ 广 « 1 * ^ I 
n = ^ l p B + ( l - p ) A - 2 y M ^ , (40) 
P ' l + r [ ^ L u � j 
where P ^ ~ ~ ? ^ ^ ^ ~ ~ . 丨 “u(C + X) + (l-u)(D + V) j 
Appendix Nine show the derivation and intuition of (40), From that we have the 
following proposition: 
Proposition Six Asset Price = Weighted Average QC > 0) 
Given assumption A and the presence of fiindamental risk, the roles of i and n 
are symmetric in the sense that price of the risky asset is a weighted average oftheir 
beliefs. From (40)，asset price is equal to the difference between the weighted 
35 M notations, this assumption means Vaft(Pt+i+dt+i) = Vart^Vi) + VaTt(dt+i). 
Since disturbance in price is only caused by noise in this paper, the assumption that price and dividend 
are independently distributed impUes only the statistical independence of noise and dividend and 
nothing else. 
^ hi notations, i perceive that OVi+d^ +i) - ^ ( A , C+X); 
i 
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expected return, [PB + (l-P)A] and weighted risk premium, ly ^(D + Y )， 
T^ 
discounted at the riskfree interest rate.  
Similar to the a in Chapter 3 where fiindamental risk does not exist, P 
measures the relative influence ofn in the market. When the number of n rises (i.e. u)， 
their influence to the market rises; when n perceive that there is increasing risk in 
either price (i.e. D) or dividend (i.e. Y), they reduce their positions in the risky asset 
so their influence in the market falls. It will be showed at the end of Section 4.2 that 
whether there is unique equilibrium depending on the value ofp. 
Unlike a, P is not equal to zero, provided that u and X are positive, and ( p + Y ) 
is fmite. This means, given i realizing that there is fundamental risk in trading the 
I 
t 
asset, the existence of n who believes that there is bounded return variance in the 
I 
market guarantees that price is noisy.^ ^ It can be easily shown in Appendix Ten that 丨 
the ckssical equilibrium in the presence of fiindamental risk is represented by: ： 
d l(2rX^ … � - I 
P t = — — 7 ^ • (41). , r rl^l-w y I 
; * T 
‘ . . 
Note that (41) is exactly in the form of (2) that we mentioned in Chapter One. With P ‘ 
and X 本 0, (40) generally deviates from (41) so we will only achieve noisy 
equilibrium in this section. The reason is that, given fundamental risk, risk-averse i is 
unwilling to take an infinite position even when asset price deviates from the 
fundamental value. Since there is no riskless arbitrage, i would only take a finite 
positions and n s beliefs can affect price of the risky asset.^ * 
whereas n perceive that (pt+i+dt+i) ~"^N(B, D+Y). 
"This idea holds regardless ofwhether n realizes that there is fimdamental risk or not (i.e. it holds for 
bothY>0andY = 0). 拥 As we will show later, price would converge to the classical equilibrium of (41) only v^^en (D+Y) 
converges to infinity. That case is trivial because there is effectively no n in the market. 
i 
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4.2 Determination of A and B 
In the following, we will solve the equilibrium values of A, B, (C+X) and 
(D+Y) and thus price of risky asset. The values of A and (C+X) are endogenously 
determined by i s rational expectations on expected retum and retum variance; 
whereas the values o f B and (D+Y) are determined by n s noisy expectations. To 
specify f s and n s expectations in a formal statement, we make the following 
assumptions, which is symmetric to Assumption B. 
4.2.1 Assumption C 
(a) i have rational expectations on risk and retum. Jn notations: 
A = (tPt+i+A+i)，i.e. rational expectation expected retum; (11 a) 
I 
(C+X) = VaTt(pt+i) + VaTt(dt+i), i.e. rational expectation retum variance, (l lc) I 
i 
(b) n have noisy expectations on risk and retum. According to (3), B and (D+Y) are a 
I 
linear transformation o f A and (C+X) respectively: , 
I 
B = aiA + bi； 
I (D+Y) = a2(C+X) + b2/' ‘ 
I 
FoUowing De Long, we investigate the case by which the unpredictability o f n s . 
beUefcause excessive price volatility. Therefore, we assume bj to be stochastic: 
bu = e,, where e,-"'N(e*,o'). 
Finally, n s expectations are represented by: 
B, 二 aiA + e,, where e^  -"^ N(e*, o )^; 
B* = a,A+e* (12a)  
(D+Y) = a (^C+X) + b2.4� 0 ^  
39 When either a!本 1 OT b!本 0，n�s perceived expected retum is biased. When either a2 本 1 or b2 本 0， 
n'sperceived retum variance is biased. ai and 4 measures the response ofB and (OfY) to change in 
A and (C+X) respectively, b, and b2 are exogenous variables in B and ^H-Y) that are indepaident of 
A and (C+X) respectively. 
i 
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ImpUcations of Assumption C are similar to Assumption B in Chapter 3. In 
the following, we will apply Assumption C steps by steps to solve (40) in order to 
gain thorough understanding ofthe reaction model. We use (lla) to define the RE 
line in Section 4.2.2. Then, we add (12a) into the RE line in order to calculate the 
equilibrium values o f A and B conditional on (C+X) and (D+Y) in Section 4.2.3. We 
use (l lc) in Section 4.3 to derive the value of (C+X) conditional on (D+Y) and 
finally, we use (12c) to solve the value of (D+Y). 
4.2.2 RE Line and NE Line 
In this part we solve for the reaction of i s perceived expected retum (A) to 
n�s perceived expected retum (B). In addition, we assume temporarily that i 
perceives B = B^  with mean B* Vt. Then, (40) becomes: 
^ ^ + l | " ) [ 2 y [ ^ ^ ^ ] l (42) 
1 + r 1 + r [ L 2/ 」， 
Applying (lla) in Assumption C to the model, it can be easily showed that: 
A 二 - ^ \ p B * +(1 - P)d - 2 y [ ^ + D ] l + d (43) 
r + P 1 L u � J 
See Appendix Eleven for derivation of (42) and (43). 
(43) defmes the rational expectation expected retum of i (A) as a function of 
noisy expectation expected retum of n (B*), which is the RE line in the presence of 
fundamental risk. Similarly, (12a) defines noisy expectation expected retum ofn (B^  
and B*) as a function ofrational expected retum of i (A), which is the RE line in the 
presence of ftindamental risk. The intersection of RE and NE lines gives the 
equilibrium values of A and B. 
恥 From (lla) and (11c)，perceived retum distribution by i at time t is: 0>t+i+dt+i) ~"^(A, C+X); 
whereas from (12a) and (12c)，perceived retum distribution by n at time t is: (Pm+dt+i)t -"^N(aiA+Ct, 
a2(C+X>t-b2). 
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4.2.3 Equilibrium values of A and B 
In this section we solve for the values of A and B in terms of (C+X) and 
(D+Y) by adding (12a) into (43). It can be easily shown that the equilibrium price 
conditional on (C+X) and (D+Y) is: 
= ^ g ^ ^ + _ _ ^ j [ _ [ ^ & i ^ ] l (44) 
Pt l + r r ^ p - p a X L “ � j 
From which we can get the equilibrium values of A and B conditional on (C+X) and 
(D+Y): 
广 � ~r 
A=^~-~~lpe*4(l-p) + pa,]d-2y 风。+ ” +^  (45a) 
r + p - p a , t L « � J 
B* = a,(——-——11 pe * +[(1 - P) + pa, ]d 一 2 y l E R l I ^ + a,d + e * (45b) {r + /3-/3aJ[ L “ � J 
R =ai——-——l|j3e• +[(1 - )3) + pa ,} i - 2 y l ^ ^ ^ + ^  l + a,d + e, (45c) \r + fi-fiaJ[ L « �J 
See Appendix Twelve for derivations of (44)，(45a), (45b) and (45c). Condition for 
the existence ofequilibrium in (44)，（45a), (45b) and (45c) is (rfp-paO 本 0. The RE 
and NE Unes are exactly the same as those in Figure One except that the slope ofRE 
r • /^ + Px lme is ( ). 
P 
By p 本 0 in (44) and X 本 0 in (41), asset price generally deviates from the 
fundamental value of (41)，{- 一“^^^1. In other words, price is noisy. Also, \r r{X-u)) 
whether there is no equilibrium, unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria of Pt 
depends on whether there is no equilibrium, unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria 
of p. Recall that P is defined by (C+X) and (D+Y). As we will see in Section 4.3， 
(C+X) can be endogenously defined as a function of (D+Y) by i s rational 
expectation on retum variance. EquUibrium values of (C+X) and (D+Y) can be 
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determined after we specify n s noisy expectation on return variance, which defmes 
another function between (C+X) and (D+Y). Hence, we have the following 
proposition: 
Proposition Seven EquiUbrium is determined by P QL > 0) 
Given Assumption A，(lla) and (12a) in Assumption C, as well as the 
presence of fundamental risk, price is generally noisy. Whether there is no 
equilibrium, unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria depends on the value of P, 
which in turn is depending on perceived return variances of investors. Since i s 
perceived return variance is endogenously determined by rational expectation, 
specification o f n s perceived return variance determines the nature of equilibrium 
price.  
4.3 Rational Expectation on Retum Variance (RV Line) 
In this section, we solve for the value of (C+X) as a function of (D+Y) 
according to rational expectation on retum variance by i, which is specified by (llc) 
in Assumption C. 
From (44), rational expectation retum variance, C, is given by: 
c 一 _si_ e,2 一 r ^ ( c + x ) ]2 丄 
(l + r)2 _ L " ( C + X ) + ( l -w)(Z) + r ) J (l + r)2 
(46) is a third degree equation in C, which defmes the (C+X), as a relation to (D+Y). 
Upon factorization and restricting the values of (C+X) and (D+Y) to be non-negative, 
we have: 
{ ( c + x ) ， ( z ) + r ) } = | A $ ] ， 〔 i ) ( c + � [ ^ 6 - i | . (47) 
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See Appendix Thirteen for derivation of(47). (47) is the RV line in the presence of 
fundamental risk, which defmes the rational expectation retum variance, (C+X), as a 
relation to the n s misperceived retum variance, (D+Y). In Figure Seventeen, we 
draw the RV Une and illustrate how it shifts when u and „ ^ . change. Note that 
( l + r ) 
the minimum value of(C+X) is X, or the minimum value of C is 0. When C ~> 0， 
(D+Y) — 00. 
Comparing (47) to (18a, b) in Section 3.3, we can see how the introduction of 
fimdamental risk into the model changes the equilibrium values of C and D. From 
(18a), the classical equilibrium price variance that C = 0 is satisfied by any positive 
and finite D; from (47), C = 0 is satisfied only when (D+Y) converges to infmity/^ 
Since infinite (D+Y) is trivia^ classical equilibrium is ruled out by the introduction 
of fimdamental risk. 
Note that this is not the only effect of fundamental risk. In fact, introduction 
offondamental risk changes the whole relationship between C and D, not only at the 
point o f C = 0，in the sense that the slope ofRV line is depending on the values ofX. 
From (47)，slope ofRV line is: 
"(組)二 m j i ^ ^ r 1 - ^ 1—ii • (48) d{C + X) {l-u)[2C'' l + rl, CJ 
(48) indicates that slope ofRV line is decreasing in X. In addition, whether RV has 
upward sloping portion depends on whether the foUowing condition holds: 
X> g2 (49) 27(l + r)2 
I f X is small, in the sense that (49) does not hold, slope ofRV is first negative, then 
41 From (39b)，(D+Y) = oo means that the demands ofn is zero for all prices. We do not focus in this 
case since there is effectively no n in the market. 
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positive, and finally negative as C rises. If X is large, in the sense that (49) holds, 
slope ofRV is negative for all values of C. 
Derivations of (48) and (49) are given by Appendix Fourteen. In Figure 
Eighteen, we illustrate how RV line shifts when X changes. We summarize the effect 
ofincreasing X on RV line in the following proposition: 
Proposition Eight Slope of RV Line depends on X (X > 0) 
Given Assumption A, (11a)，(llb) and (12a) in Assumption C as well as the 
presence of fiindamental risk，the slope of RV line falls as X rises, as indicated by 
(48). tfX is small (i.e. (49) does not hold), slope ofRV line is at first negative, then 
positive, and finally negative as C rises; i f X is large (i.e. (49) holds), slope o f R V 
line is constantly negative as C rises.  
Proposition Eight says that increasing fimdamental risk tends to make the RV 
line more negatively sloping. RecaU that RV Hne is the reaction of i � s perceived 
retum variance to that of n under f s rational expectation on risk. Increasing 
ftmdamental risk thus make this reaction more negative, in the sense that when n s 
perceived retum variance rises, that of i tends to Mls. Up to sufficiently high 
fimdamental risk that (49) is satisfied, this reaction is strictly negative, which means, 
graphically, RV line looks like more linear, i.e. it has no upward sloping portion. This 
simplifies the model dramatically since all reaction functions (i.e. RE, NE, RV, NV) 
would then be linear. Linearity of reaction fixnctions in the RE-NE diagram implies 
the existence of unique equilibrium values of A and B conditional on P，whereas 
linearity of reaction functions in the RV-NV diagram implies unique equilibrium 
values of(C+X), (D+Y) and thus P. When substituting them into the price function 
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of (42)，it means the existence of a unique noisy equilibrium price in the reaction 
model. However, when (49) is not satisfied and so RV has upward sloping portion, 
we may achieve multiple equilibria, depending on the specification of the NV line. 
To iUustrate the idea, we study De Longs and Bhushan�s models in Section 4.4. We 
will show that, in two separate sub-sections, while the imposition ofDe Long，s NV 
into the model results in unique equilibrium, imposition ofBhushan's NV may result 
in multiple equilibria. 
4.4 Noisy Expectation on Retum Variance ^ W line) 
Similar to Chapter 3，the roles of i and n are symmetric in case there is 
fundamental risk, n s expectation on price variance would defines another relation 
between (C+X) and (D+Y), which is the NV line. bitersection o f R V and NV lines 
determines the equilibrium values of(C+X) and (D+Y) and hence asset price. 
From (12c)，the NV line is (D+Y) = &(C+X) +、，where a^  and h are the 
slope and intercept ofthe NV line. If equilibrium exists, it is generally noisy. We can 
have no equilibrium, unique noisy equilibrium or multiple noisy equilibria, 
depending on the values of & and t>2. We illustrate the idea in Figure Nineteen. Once 
the values of(C+X) and (D+Y) are determined, we can solve for the value of p by 
B = ti(C + X ) and then the equilibrium price by (44). This can be 
P w(C + X ) + (l-w)(i) + 7) 
accomplished by two methods: 
Method One 
The complete model can be summarized by (12a)，（12c)，(43), (47) and (42). (12a) 
and (43) are reaction functions in the RE-NE diagram, form which we can determine 
^^^^^^^^——^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^—^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^—~—^—^^~-^^^^^ 
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investors�perceived expected returns (A and B); (12c) and (47) are reaction 
functions in the RV-NV diagram, from which we can determine investors�perceived 
return variances ((C+X) and (D+Y)). Substituting the resulting values of A, B，(C+X) 
and (D+Y) into (42), we obtain the equilibrium asset price in reduced form. 
Method Two 
The complete model can be summarized by (12c)，(47) and (44). (12c) and (47) gives 
equilibrium values of (C+X) and (D+Y). Substituting them into (44), which is 
conditional on (C+X) and (D+Y), we obtain the equilibrium asset price in reduced 
form. 
In the foUowing two subsections, we show that both De Long's and 
Bhushans models are special cases in this paper, with the same specification in (12a) 
but different specifications in (12c). 
4.4.1 De Long�s Model 
De Long assumes that the difference between i s and n s expected returns is 
an independently and identically distributed process. In addition, he assumes that the 
perceived retum variance is the same for n. Therefore, he implicitly assumes the 
values ofai, % and b2 in (12a) and (12c) respectively to be: 
a1 = l ;a2=l;b2 = O. (20a) 
Substituting (20a) into (12a) and (12c), noisy expectations of n are represented by the 
reaction functions of: 
B, = A + e,, where e,-" 'N(e*,a'); 
B* = A + e*; (21a) 
(D+Y) = (C+X). (21d) 
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(i) Equilibrium Price 
From either Method One or Two, we can show that asset price, price variance 
and expected price are respectively: 
= l f ^ ! ^ + i “ * + ^ 2 y p ^ + j 4 ; (50) Ft 1 + r r [ L(l + r) 丄 
C = _ ^ ; (51) 
(l + r)2 
^ _ 2 2 一 
p = -{ue*+d-2y -^^-^ + X 1. (52) 
^ r[ [ ( l + r ) ' JJ 
See Appendix Fifteen for derivations of (50), (51) and (52). Existence of a unique 
noisy equilibrium in De Long�s model is a direct result of (21d), which specifies the 
NV line to be (C+X) = (D+Y). We illustrate this idea in Figure Twenty. 
(ii) Effect ofIncreasing u 
De Long studied the effect of increase in the number of noise traders on the 
variance ofretum f/.g.^C + Z ) ) • prom (51), this effect is positive. We show this 
V du J 
argument graphically in Figure Twenty-One. Like the existence of a unique noisy 
equilibrium, the fact that ^ > 0 in De Long's model is a direct result of (21d). 
4.4.2 Bhushan�s Model 
Like De Long, Bhushan also assumes that the difference between i�s and n s 
expected retums is an independently and identically distributed process. Unlike De 
Long, he assumes that i�s and n�s perceived return variances are independent. In 
terms of (12a) and (12c), he implicitly assumes the values of a” ％ and 1½ 
respectively to be: 
ai = 1 ； 32 = 0; b2 = an exogenous variable. (20b) 
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Substituting (20b) into (12a) and (12c)，noisy expectations of n are represented by 
the reaction ftmctions of: 
B, = A + e,, where e t � � ( e *， a " ) ; 
B* = A + e*; (21a) 
(D+Y) = b2. (21e) 
The direct result of (21e) is a horizontal NV line in Bhushans model. 
Together with the RV line, we can see that noisy equilibrium always exists. If 
2 
X < , there can be up to three noisy equilibria, depending on the value of 27(l + r ) ' 
b2. For small but positive b2, we have one equilibrium; for intermediate b2, we have 
two to three equilibria; for large b2, we have one equilibrium again. On the other 
2 
hand if X > ， there is always unique noisy equilibrium. We illustrate the 
， 27(l + r)2 
idea graphically in Figure Twenty-Two. 
(i) Comparison with De Long 
Bhushan�s model is a generalization ofDe Long's model in the sense that if 
2 2 
b = ^ ^ + X , De Long�s unique equilibrium is equal to one of the multiple 
2 (l + r)2 
equUibria in Bhushan's model. In this case, asset price variances in the three 
equilibria are respectively: 
Q = - ^ ； (53a) 
1 (l + r)2 
_ y ^ | p Z f ^ ^ l _ l ; ( 5 3 b ) 
2 2 ( l + r ) V “ 1_(1-咖」 “ 
w 乂 
c g(l-^)^^^LLj^r_llZ^T|-^. (53C) 
3 2 (l + r)2 \ u L(l_w)<jJ w 
w 乂 
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Appendix Sixteen shows the derivations of(53a), (53b) and (53c). I f X = 0, (53a)， 
(53b) and (53c) converges respectively to (25b)，(25c) and (25a) in Chapter 3 where 
there is no fundamental risk. 
(ii) Bhushan�s Convergence 
Bhushan also shown the conditions under which Cj is the only solution in the 
model (i.e. De Longs unique noisy equilibrium exists). The condition is that either 
Ci = C2 = C3, or C2 and C3 not exist. Appendix Seventeen shows that a negatively 
sloping RV line, in which X satisfies (49)，is sufficient for the existence ofDe Longs 
unique noisy equilibrium in Bhushan�model. While Bhushan�s example specifies 
2 2 
onlv to b, = + X , the sufficient condition of a negatively sloping NV Hne 2 (i + , )2 
applies to all values 0fb2. In this manner, we have the following proposition: 
Proposition Nine (49) is Sufficient for Uniqueness in Bhushan s Model (X > 0) 
Given Assumption A & C and the presence of fimdamental risk, the sufficient 
condition for the existence of a unique equilibrium in Bhushans model is the 
presence of a negatively sloping NV Une; in other words, (49)，X > 2 7 ( � + ” 2 
holds.  
(iii) Effect ofIncreasing u 
Effect of increase in the number of noise traders on price and retum variances 
in Bhushans model is not as clear as that in De Long's model. The possibility of 
, . . … ， ^ dC d{C + X ) . 
multiple equiHbria is the key reason why it is difficult to study — or — m 
2 d c 
Bhushan model. If X>~~-~"7，—>0, since there is only one equilibrium 
27(l + rY du 
^2 
that lies on a downward sloping RV line and a horizontal NV line. If X < - ^ — , 
27(1 + r) 
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things are more complicated. In some circumstances, one or two equilibria may fail 
to exist when u increases. We may skip this problem by assuming the existence of 
three equilibria before and after u increase, and this is what Bhushan did. He argued 
that in general there are conflicting comparative statics between the three noisy 
equilibria. We show this idea graphically in Figure Twenty-Three. 
By now, we can summarize Section 4.4 in the following proposition: 
Proposition Ten De Long s and Bhushan s Model are Special Cases Qi > 0) 
Given Assumption A & C and the presence of fundamental risk, both De Longs and 
Bhushan's models are a special case of our model in the sense that n s expectations 
are Unear transformations of i s expectations. De Long and Bhushan assume the 
same NE, the perceived expected retum of n as a fimction of that of i, but they 
assume different NYs, the perceived retum variance of n as a function ofthat ofi. 
4.5 Change in Relative Perceived Retum Variance 
We have show how different specifications of n s expectations regarding risk 
and retum gives different equilibrium prices of the risky asset. The situation is partly 
illustrated by reviews ofDe Long�s and Bhushan�s models in Section 3.4. Although 
they assume the same NE, they reach different conclusions when they assume 
different NVs. In the general reaction model, things are more complicated, because 
we may have different NEs as well. The problem is that we do not have generally 
agreed theory on n s expectations, and so far there is few literature which gives 
thorough analyses to the problem. However, we can derive some implications from 
the model regarding changes in n s beliefs. In the foUowing, we show that ifrelative 
perceived retum variance of n rises, the price variance falls. If the assumption that 
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difference between investors�perceived expected returns is an iid process holds, 
expected price falls as well, provided that n is sufficiently bullish, or fundamental 
risk is sufficiently high. 
4.5.1 Specification of n s Expectation 
Similar to Chapter 3，ambiguity in the specification of n s expectation leads 
to ambiguity in the number of equilibria as well as conflicting comparative statics 
0*2 
with respect to exogenous changes in u and ^^ _^ y^ . Like Chapter 3，as u increases, 
the RV line shifts up, and the intersection point ofRV and NV lines moves along the 
NV line, so different specifications o f N V line result in conflicting effects on retum 
variance. As in Chapter 3, we do not study the effect of changing u in view ofthe 
problem of unspecified n s expectations，but we can show that, when the relative 
perceived retum variance of n rises, price and retum variances fall; the effect on 
price level is not clear. 
4.5.2 Relative Perceived Retum Variance of n，0 
D + Y 
Defme the ratio of (D+Y) to (C+X) as 0，i.e. 0 = ; ^ 7 ^ • We would show C + Ji 
that when 0 rises, C falls. Note that a given equilibrium values of (C+X) and (D+Y) 
from any NV line have a unique ©. In De Long�s model, 0 is constantly equal to 1, 
since the NV line is (C+X) = (D+Y); while in Bhushan�model, each of the multiple 
equilibria have a unique 0, as illustrated in Figure Twenty-Four. 
This section studies the effect of increasing n s relative perceived retum. In 
De Longs mode^ we cannot study the effect of increasing 0 since © = 1 always 
holds; while in Bhushans model, we have multiple equilibria so we dont have 
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unique effect ofincreasing 0. By specifying a given value of 0 and raising this value 
a Uttle bit, we could bypass the problems of fixed © and multiple 0. In this manner, 
we normalize the NV line into (D+Y) 二 ©(C+X), and thus the changes in a^  and b2 
into change in 0. 
dc 4.5.2.1 Effect of Increasing 0 on Price Variance,— 
£) + 7 
Substituting = 0 into P，we have: 
C- + JL 
P = ^(C + � = _ _ ^ • _ . (54) “u(C + X) + (l-u)(D + Y) u + (l-u)0 
From (54)，we can see that the derivative of P with respect to 0 is: 
1 - _ ( 1 - * = _ f l z i i V < o . (55) de [M + (1-M)0f 1 u ) 
Therefore, when 0 rises, P falls. Substituting (54) into (46), we have: 
C 二 " 2 c x 2 = r ^ _ _ T c72 
(l + r)2 [M + (1-M)0J (l + r)2. 
Differentiating (56) with respect to 0, we have: 
dC:dCdp: 2pa^�1-权)召2]二 2(1-¾^"^ ^ “ ^ ^ “ (1 + rf [ [~VJ J~ M(l + r)2 . 
dc 
From (57), we can see that as 0 rises, C and (C+X) falls; in other words, — < 0 • In a& 
dc 
addition, as 0 rises and p falls,——rises (it becomes less negative). When 0 ~> Qo, d& 
B and — •> 0. The same is also true for 啦 + 幻 since (C+X) and C can be used d& dB 
interchangeably when X is regarded as constant. 
Graphically, 0 defines the slope of a straight line that goes through the origin 
and a point in the RV Une. When © rises, the slope of this straight line increases. As 
shown in Figure Twenty-Five, (C+X) Mls as a result. Therefore, we have 
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Proposition Eleven: 
Proposition Eleven Price Variance is Decreasing in © (X > 0) 
Given Assumption A & C and the presence of fundamental risk, when the n s 
relative perceived retum variance rises, the retum variance M s , and vice versa. In 
addition, this negative relation between n s relative perceived retum variance and 
true retum variance diminishes as the former rises.  
Intuition of Proposition Eleven is straightforward. As n s relative perceived 
retum variance rises, they reduces their positions in the risky asset in face of 
increasing risk they believe. Their relative influence on the market, as measured by 
P，is thus reduced. This in turns reduces the noise traders，risk in the market. Since 
price and retum variances are conditional solely on noise traders�risk in this model, 
the fmal outcome is a reduction in noise-generated price and retum variances. In 
addition, this reduction in variance is diminishing marginally as noise traders� 
gradually withdraw from the market. 
4.5.2.2 Effect of© increase on expected price level, ^ ； 
Mv9 
(a.) Uncertainty in 盖 
From (57)，we know that when © rises, p M s . Recall from (40) and (42) that 
p(B,-B*) . 
price level is equal to the sum of a discounted disturbance, j ^ , and a 
discounted difference between expected retum, [pB + (l-p)A], and risk premium, 
2y 帅 + D . The values ofAand B are determined by (12a)，(43) and Figure One 
L 2/ J 
yf j jJ 广 I ^ ^ 
with the slope ofRE Une = — ^ instead of ~ ~ ^ . When 0 rises, slope ofRE Une 
rises. The intersection point ofRE and NE moves along the NE line. Depending on 
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the values ofai and e*, we can have different effects of 0 increase on A and B*. In 
this mamier, the effect of © increase on expected price level is uncertain. With the 
slope o f R E line = ^ ^ ^ instead of ^ ^ , Figure Fourteen illustrates how we ^ p a 
achieve different outcomes when different NE lines are imposed. 
(b.) ^ when(21a)holds d& 
Ifthe NE mie is specified, we can work out the effect of increasing © on price 
level. For illustration, we follow De Long and Bhushan in assuming that aj = 1 and 
e* is a positive parameter. In this case, the NE line in (12a) becomes (21a): B* = A + 
e*. 
Substituting (21a) into (44), we have: 
A , r � i { p e * + “ 4 ^ ^ ] } 
l + r ^1 L “ � J . (58) 
d Je,-e^ e*\ 2y ^{D + Y) = — +P — + — r V 1 + ^ r y r u 
The effect on price leve^ then, is depending on the relative change of second and 
,' i 
third terms of (58). To get rid of the period-to-period fluctuation, we study instead : 
the effect on expected price level, p. By (58), we have: 
p A l , , p e ^ - M i ^ l (59) 
r u L ^ 
The second term in [...] falls as 0 rises. The effect on third term, the risk premium, 
however, is more complicated, since (D+Y) is a nonlinear function of ©，which is 
conditional on X. See Figure Twenty-Six for an illustration of the effect ofincreasing 
0 on the third term. 
From (59), it can be shown that the effect of increasing © on p is depending 
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on whether the following condition holds for all 辨二- )： 
, * > M ^ f l + _ A _ ^ ^ ^ ) . (60) 
u 1^ D^Y dp J 
Appendix Eighteen shows the derivation of (60). If (60) holds, the effect of 
increasing © on p is continuously negative; otherwise, it is first negative, then 
positive, and fmally negative. Note that as © rises, the sign of 
耶 + f ) = " ( D + ” 避 is first negative, then positive, and fmally negative i f X is 
dp cm dp 
smaU; it is constantly negative if X is large. Thus, there may be a non-linear 
rektionship between p and 0 i f X is small. 
f n2 2 \ 
Substituting (Z) + Y ) = 0(C + X ) - ® | ^ ^： ^ + ^ into (59), we have: 
, ^ L , p e ^ , ^ { ^ . x ] l (61) 
,L u Ui+^) ). 
From (61)，we can show the limiting expected price when 0 •> 0 and © ~» oo are 
respectively: 
j_i_g* 
p ~> ； and (62) r 
p ^ ' - U - ^ X (63) rV l-u) 
(63) is the ckssical equilibrium price of(41). Therefore when © ~» oo, p ~> classical 
equilibrium. 
According to (61)，the derivative of p with respect to 0 is: 
r — 、 - ，^^ 2 
^ J 2yg2 [ l z i i ] 2 0 - l p2 _ ( i _ j , ) e * _ 2 y X ^ . (64) 
d& [(l + r)'Lv “ J J ^ 
The 1访 term in {•••} of(64) is first negative and then positive as © rises. One of the 
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implications from (64) is that if either e* or X is large, {• •.} is negative for all values 
of 0; thus, p is constantly decreasing in 0. See Appendix Nineteen for the 
derivations and intuitions of (62)，(63) and (64). See Figure Twenty-Seven for a 
detailed graphically interpretations of (62), (63) and (64). 
From (64)，we have the following proposition: 
Proposition Tweh e^ Expected Price may decrease in 0 pC > 0) 
Given Assumption A & C，the presence of fundamental risk, and that the 
difference in investors�expected retum is an iid process (i.e. De Longs or Bhushan s 
NE holds), ifboth X and e* are small (there is low dividend risk and at the same time 
n is not very bullish), the price level is first decreasing, then increasing, and finally 
decreasing in 0 (i.e. n s relative perceived retum risk). On the other hand, if X 
and/or e* are brge, price level is continuously decreasing in 0. Jn all cases, expected 
price converges to the classical equilibrium of (41) as 0 rises to infinity.  
Interpretation of Proposition Twelve is as follows. RecaU that asset price is 
the difference between weighted perceived expected retum and weighted risk , 
premium. As 0 rises, both weighted expected retum and weighted risk premium 
change. Firstly, n s weight in expected retum (i.e. p) falls. To the extent that n is 
bullish (i.e. e* > 0), weighted expected retum falls. It has (-) effect on expected price. 
Secondly, i s perceived retum risk (i.e. (C+X)) falls, which tends to reduce the 
weighted risk premium. It has (+) effect on expected price. Thirdly, n s perceived 
retum risk (i.e. (D+Y)) changes conditionally on the value ofX. I f X is small (i.e. (49) 
does not hold), n s perceived retum risk will first rise, then fall, and finally rise. It 
tends to change the weighted risk premium in the same direction; the effect on price 
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i s (-，+，-)• I f X is large (i.e. (49) holds), n s perceived retum risk monotonously falls; 
the effect on price is thus (-). Total effect of rise in 0 on expected price depends on 
the relative strengths ofthese three components. If n is very bullish (i.e. e* is large), 
the (-) effect of weighted expected retum dominates the possible (+) effect of 
weighted risk premium when X is small, the net effect on expected price is then (-). 
I f X is large, there is only (-) effect ofweighted risk premium; combined with the (-) 
effect of weighted expected retum, the net effect on expected price is (-). When 
neither n is very bullish nor X is large, the (-, +, -) effect of weighted risk premium 
d 
dominates the (-) effect ofweighted expected retum, the net effect on expected price 
i 
is then (-, +，-). 
f 
Finally, as n s relative perceived retum risk rises to an extremely high level 
i 
(i.e. 0 is close to infmity), their positions is close to 0. In essence, n disappears from . 
i 
the market, and so we have the classical equilibrium. 
i 
\ 
4.6 Relative Perceived Price Risk versus Relative Perceived 
'k 
Dividend Risk * 
One must be cautious that ifwe consider n s relative perceived price risk and 
n s relative perceived dividend risk separately, a rise in either one does not mean that 
there is a rise in n s relative retum risk. In this section we consider an alternative 
specification o f n s perceived retum risk instead of (12c) to illustrate this idea. Recall 
from (12c) that we assume that n s expectation of retum variance is a Unear 
transformation ofthat ofTs: (D+Y) = &(C+X) + b2. In Section 4.5, we summarize 
the information 0fa2 and b2 into a single variable, 0 二 ^^^^^ , and study the effect (C +A) 
of increasing 0. In this section, we study separately the effect of increasing D 
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relative to C and Y relative to X on retum variance. 
First, we consider n s noisy expectation on retum variance. Define 0j =昏 
and ©2 = — . If we stick to the assumption that n s expectation is a linear X 
transformation ofthat of i�s，we could write explicitly: 
D = a3C + b3 = 0iC; and (65a) 
Y = a4X + b4 = 02X. (65b) 
In this manner, ©1 and ©2 just two variables that summarize the information of (a3, b3) ' 
j 
and (a4, b4) respectively.'' Adding up (65a) and (65b)，we have: 
(D+Y) = 0iC + 02X 
( 似 ) 二 0 " = © / - ^ 1 + ^ 2 ( 7 ; ^ ] = ®1 + (^2 - ^ 4 v ^ ] • (66) ‘ (C + X) \ c + x ) \ c + x j Vc^x) 
(66) interprets 0° as weighted average of 0i and 02, with the weight being ， 
/ 广 � f Y \ 丨 
_ _ and — ~ respectively. We could regard 0° as function of 0i, ©2 and [c+x) l c + x j r I 
C, i.e. 0° = fl：©!, ©2, C). Together with the RV line of (47) and utilizing the implicit 
ftmction theorem, we show in Appendix Twenty that ^ - and ^ - > 0 only if: 
1 2 V 
们 ^ � 1 r u ) c7 ( c + z ) 2 43 -
( e . - e . ) > ^ [ ^ j Y : ^ - ^ . (67) 
dc 
Since the right-hand-side of(67) is positive, if02 is sufficiently larger than ©” — 
and dC wouM be positive. Recall from (57) that the relationship between C and © 
cm^ 
is negative. We could summarize the idea as follow: 
If(67) holds: ©1个0�©2个"^ G)>l4 C and (C+X)t; 
If(67) does not hold: €^个 or 0 2 个 — 0 个 — C and (C+X)>k (68) 
42 Note that the assumptions in (65a) and (65b) are just for illustration. There can be up to thousand 
different specifications ofnoisy expectations on D and Y. Readers are encouraged to work out the 
alternatives to see how things change in the model. 
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D Y . (Z) + r ) . „ ^ 
One strange result in (68) is that when — or — nses, — ~ — may fall. From C Ji (C + Ji) 
( X \ 
(66), it is because the negative effect on - ~ - as C rises is so ku*ge that renders 
\C^-X) 
any initial rise in 0! or 02 insignificant, resulting in a fall in 0. Therefore, we have 
the following proposition: 
Proposition Thirteen 0 would increase in 0 j & 02 onty if (67) holds pC > 0) 
Given Assumption A，(llc) in Assumption C，(65a) and (65b)，as weU as the 
presence offiindamental risk, a rise in n s relative perceived price/dividend risk (i.e. 
0 j or 02) would lead to a rise in retum risk (i.e. (C+X)) if n s relative perceived : 
dividend risk (Le. ©2) is sufficient larger than n s relative perceived price risk (i.e. 









43 For a review ofimpUcit function theorem, see Chiang (1984), p. 206-214. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper suggests a reaction approach for asset price determination. 
Throughout Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, we have construct a framework in which noise 
traders^ expectations may affect the level and variance of asset price by changing 
expected retum and risk premium, as well as a noise-generated disturbance 
component of asset price. Like most articles in noise trading literature, this paper : 
/ 
argues that actions ofnoise traders generally have influence on asset prices. In other i 
words, rational expectation is not the only determinant of asset retums, and asset 
prices are noisy. Unlike others, the focus ofthis paper is put on the symmetric roles 
between noise traders and sophisticated investors. There are two-layer reactions 
气 
between noise traders and sophisticated investors: on one hand, they react to each : 
other in determining expected retum (i.e. RE-NE diagram); on the other, they react to 
each other in determining the retum variance (i.e. RV-NV diagram). 
t 
i 
One application ofthe reaction model is that it provides an explanation why ‘ 
De Long (1987, 1989，1990a，1991) and Bhushan (1997) reached conflicting 
conclusions on the effect of increasing number of noise traders in the same OLG 
model. De Long�s idea that noise traders�risk causes excessive price volatility is 
now generaUy accepted, but the way De Long introduced it into the asset price model 
may not be agreed by all authors. Bhushan (1997) is certainly one of them. As we 
have seen, the combination that noise traders have stochastic expected retum and 
arbitrageurs have rational expectation regarding retum variance implies that the RV 
line is non-linear. Jn this manner, we may have problems of non-existence and 
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multiplicity of equilibrium, as well as conflicting comparative statics when we 
assumes that noise traders has different reactions to arbitrageurs. Nonetheless, our 
paper does give some definite outcomes that are generally true for all possible noise 
traders�expectations. That is, when noise traders�perceived retum risk rises relative 
to that ofsophisticated investors, the price variance falls. 
Another possible critic to De Long�s model is that he assumed that 
unpredictability in noise traders�beliefs is exogenously determined. This is the 
ultimate reason why noisy expectation can cause excessive price volatility even in 
the absence of fundamental risk. While it is an interesting theoretical possibility, it 
may not be reasonable in reality that noise traders would have noisy expectation in a 
riskless perpetuity that guarantees absolutely certain cashflow. A more reasonable 
i 
assumption may be considered: unpredictability in noisy traders�belief is an 
increasing function of fixndamental risk, hi notation, we may assume that o^  = ^X, 
where 4> is an exogenous variable. According to the outcomes in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3, price variance in the absence of and in the presence of fundamental risk 
would be 0 and f ^ • +1 X respectively. In this case, noise traders�stochastic , 
Ui+尸）J 
beliefs cause excessive price voktiUty only in the presence offundamental risk. 
It should be remembered that the reaction approach could be used in other 
circumstance as well. For example, we can study the case that there is only 
fundamental risk in the market, but noise traders and arbitrageurs perceive it 
differently. It can be easily shown that all reaction functions (RE, NE, RV，NV) 
would be linear in that case, and thus there is only unique equilibrium. A further 
simplification is to assume that investors have independent expectations on risk (i.e. 
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there is no reaction in the reaction functions). An insightful usage of this simplified 
model would be a review of the role of idiosyncratic risk in Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) when noisy traders are present. While arbitrageurs holds the market 
portfolio and bear only the systematic risk, it is argued that most noise traders or 
smaU investors do not diversified and they would then take both systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk into account when making investment. In this case, weighted risk 
premium would be: 
{systmatic risk){sysmatic risk+idiosyncratic risk) 
• ‘ ‘ " ‘ ‘ • 
u{systematic risk) + (1 - u)(systematic risk + idiosyncratic risk) 
\ 
Contrary to traditional CAPM hypothesis, idiosyncratic risk does affect both risk 
premium and asset price. See how powerful the reaction approach is. 
1 
However, the use of reaction approach in noise trading literature faces a 
common obstacle. That is, while it is generaUy agreed that sophisticated investors 
have rational expectation, so far few literatures study how noise traders form their 
expectations. With ambiguity in noise traders�expectations, we could not, say, study 
the effect ofincreasing number of noise traders on asset prices. Moreover, we cannot 
厂 
investigate the performance of reaction model in terms of, say, stability of 
equilibrium. Conceptually, if we have standard NE and NV lines, investors� 
expectations would adjust to equilibrium only if the absolute slope of these standard 
noise traders�reaction curves is smaller than that of arbitrageurs in the RE-NE and 
RV-NV diagrams. The problems, again, is that we dori t have generally agreed 
reaction fiinctions in noisy expectations. To a certain extent, the reaction approach 
"highlight^' v/hat we are missing. 
44 Related works have been developed by Shefrin and Statman (1994), v^^idi studied a bdiavioral 
CAPM in a market where noise traders interact with informational traders. Their focus is on the 
existence ofprice efficiency in the presence of noise traders. 
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Figure One 
Efliinihriuni Va1iies of A and R: RE-NF Diapram fK = 0^  
B* RE Line NE Line L———# 
B* ^ y y Equilibrium 
^^^^^^>^^^^^~^~~" Slope = ai ^ f ^ ^ ^ F ^ 
0 / ~ ~ A A 
I 
Equilibrium values of A and B is determined by the intersection of RE Line 
(which corresponds to the rational expectation of i regarding expected return) and 
NE Line (which corresponds to the noisy expectation of n regarding expected retum). 
The formulas for RE and NE are given by (14) and (12a) respectively: , 
1 r ( n \ A=-^laB*+(l-a)d-2r — \ + d; (14) r + a[ Vw / 
B* = aiA + e*. (12a) 
Equilibrium values o f A and B* are given by (16a) and (16b) respectively: 
A = ae*+[(l-a) + aa^}i-2Y\—] > + d; (16a) r + a -aa. V ^ J\ 
1 V z I 
< \ r /^ccZ)^l ‘ 
B* = a, \ae*+[(l-a)^aa^}i-2Y — \ + e*. (16b) 
l^ r + a - o w r J [ V w ) 
f + cc 
From (14) and (12a)，the slopes of RE and NE are and a! respectively. oc 
Equilibrium exists if slopes ofRE and NE are not identical (i.e. there is intersection 
point). 
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Figure Two RV I Jne (X = 0^  ^ _ _ _ ^  
T)* 急 ； 
I I u rises RV Line (18a) / L___J H i : y & ^ l ^ 
[l-u)4{l^rr / / y ^ T \ N ? ^ l ^ z 
a 2 a 2 4 ( i + , ) 2 0 + 7 7 ) 
RV line defines C as a relation to D according to i�s rational expectation on \ 
price variance, (18a) and (18b) give the formulas for RV line, which consists of two | 
segments: (C, D) = (0, (0, oo]); and (18a) 
(C,D)^{fo, “ , / — V ^ ― ~ - 1 1. (18b) 
1 1 \ l + r f \ \ l - u j L c � ‘ 5 ( l + r) J j 
^ 2 
From (18b), when C = 0 and C = - , D = 0. Hence, the left-hand-side and 
� 7 , (l + r)2 
^2 
right-hand-side horizontal intercepts are (C,D) = (0,0) and (C,D) = ( -,0) 
(l + r) 
I 
respectively. Differentiating (18b) and set the resulting derivative equal to zero, we ^ dD ( u M r 1 o- ;\^J n 1 o - 1 _ D 
have:——= i 7:;T7- 1 +C —— -^；^ ^ = O.Rearrange, dC U-wJlLc®' l + r J 1^  2)C'' 1 + rJ •‘ 
- 丄 丄 一 1 1 + � � 1 丄 丄 = 0 「 丄 1 丄 丄 = 1 c = l g2 
_C®^ l + r J t 2 ) c ^ ' l + r ‘ { l J C ^ ' l + r ， 4 ( l + r ) ' ‘ 
2 1 ( >w 2 
At C 二 —~-，D 二 . Hence, the coordinate of maximum D in 
4( l + r)2 4{l-u)(l^ry 
, , • .…^x f 1 CT^ 1 f U ) C7^ � 
the second section ^ (C,D) - , . 
[4(l + rr'4{l-u)il^ry) 
When u rises, RV line shifts up with the two horizontal intercepts unchanged; 
when - ^ rises，RV line shifts up and to the right with the right-hand-side 
l + r 
horizontal intercept moving to the right. 
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Figure Three Four Cases for which NV cuts RV (X = 0^   
Pt Pt 
B B � � 
T + 7 ^ v ^ 1+尸 ^ x ^ ^ 
^ ^ ^ � — — V l � s ^ ^ \ r 
l + r ^ V ^ 1 + , ^ " S ^ ^ � 
r ^ ^ ^ s ^  ~"^ r ~T| ^ ^ ^ 
Case One: C = 0 & D > 0 Case Two: C > 0 & D > 0 
Pt Pt 
_? A," — r 
l+r 1+r 
_ i ” 丄 ^ 
l + r l + r ^""N,i,,,^^^^^ "r] I ^ ^ r 
Case Three: C 二 D = 0 Case Four: C > 0 & D = 0 
i�s and n s demand curves for risky asset are given by (8a) and (8b) 
; i , = j - ( l + ^ , ; 义”二[(1 + 尸)凡 _ 
2yC 2yD 
When C = 0 (D = 0)，i (n) perceives that there is no risk in the market, so i (n) is 
v4 B i 
willing to trade an infinite amount to keep price at ( ); i s (n's) demand 
l + r l + r 
curve is thus a horizontal straight line. When C > 0 (D > 0), i (n) perceive that there 
is price risk in the market, so i (n) is only willing to trade at a finite amount; i s ( n s ) 
demand curve is thus a downward sloping straight line. Aggregate demand curve (not 
drawn) is given by (9): uX° + (l-u)A/ = 1. In Case One, aggregate demand curve 
coincides with i�s horizontal demand curve and so n s behavior cannot affect price, 
the classical equilibrium is achieved. In Case Four, aggregate demand curve 
coincides with n s horizontal demand curve and so i�s behavior cannot affect price, 
the noisy equilibrium is achieved. In Case Two, aggregate demand curve is a 
weighted horizontal summation of i�s and n�s demand curves so both i�s and n s 
behavior affect price; thus we have noisy equilibrium. In Case Three, aggregate 
demand is not defined; thus we have no equilibrium. 
j 
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Figure Four Different NV TJnes for the same RV l ine (X = 0^  -
^ N V i N V 2 
r ^ i > -
: P ^ ^ > ; 
'1 
(18a) and (18b) give the formula for the RV line: 
(C, D) = (0, (0, cx)]); and (18a) 
、 I 
^ ^ ' ^ > = { ( ' w l f e H ^ ^ - f 岡 
i 
(12b): D = a2C + b2 gives the formula for the NV Line. Intersections ofRV and NV 
determines the equilibrium values of C and D. When NV cuts the first section ofRV, 
we have the classical equilibrium, which is represented by the vertical intercepts in 
the RV-NV diagram (i.e. E，F or G). When NV cuts the second section of RV, we 
have the noisy equilibrium, which is represented by intersection points other than 
vertical intercepts (i.e. I，J, K, L or M). In the origin (i.e. H), no equilibrium exist. i 
Assume a upward sloping NV (i.e. % > 0)，we draw six different NVs which are 
based on different values of �a n d b2 to show how different NVs can result in either 
unique or multiple equilibria, and either classical or noisy equilibrium. For NV” we ‘ 
have unique classical equilibrium (i.e. E). For NV2, we have one classical (i.e. F) and 
one noisy (i.e. I) equilibrium. For NV3, we have one classical (i.e. G) and two noisy 
(i.e. J and K) equilibria. For NV4, there is unique noisy equilibrium (i.e. L). For NV5, 
there is unique noisy equilibrium (i.e. M). For NVg, there is no equilibrium. 
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Figure Five De T.ong s IJniniie Noisv Efluilihrium (X = 0^  
D De Long s NV 
1水 
^ , 2 ^ 2 
0 - ^ c 
(1 + 尸)2  
RV line is given by (18a) and (18b): 
(C, D) = (0, (0, o)]); and (18a) 
( C，H [ � ’ ^ f e M ^ 5 - l l . ( 1 8 b ) I 
V \ J 乂 
De Long's assumes that the perceived price variances of i and n are equal, which in 
essence impose a NV line of (21b): C = D. Solving (21a) and (18a, b)，we can see 
that De Long's NV cuts only the second section ofRV at: 
/ ^ 7^� ( wV^ wV^ ) ^ 1 、 
( c , ^ - [ W , W > 卯） 




Figure Six Effect of Increasing u in De Long s Model (X = 0^  -
y De Long s NV 
卑 / " " X x 
” 1 -,-^;;;_^^^;_^^^ 4 § ^ p . • . . • • • • • . • • • • • • ^ ^ ! • * • • • • " * • " " • * • * * * • • * • " • * ^ B ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ k ^Pf^ 
^ 权>2 t4a' c 
(l + r)2 (l + r)2  
We consider that there is a rise in the number of n (i.e. u) from Uj to ^. From 
(18b), the second section of the RV line shifts up from: 
( c , H � � , ^ f e > [ ^ + v ' ) 
球一 { [。’為 ]紛 [ ^ 7 ^ } . ( R V 2 ) 
From (F1), equilibrium values of (C, D) moves along De Long�s NV from: 
/ 2 2 2 2 � f 2 2 2 2 � �D ^ - l 办 ^> I to rc D)- ¥ ¥ 
(^”叫乂 ( 1 + 02，(1 + ” 2 ] to (C2,Z^)—l(i + r)2,(i + r )2 j . 




Figure Seven Eflui1ihrium when hoth i & n have Rational 
l a i £ £ t a t i o n on Pr ice Variance (X = 0^  
D 
^^^^^ De Long s NV 
NvN^N^2 / 
, ^ ^ V ! 
0 ^ G C  
Assume both i and n have rational expectation on price variance. When u = Uj, 
RV = RVj = IFG + Vertical Axis; NV = NVi = EFI + Horizontal Axis. There are 
multiple equilibria: E, F and G. In E, we have classical equilibrium; in F and G, we 
have noisy equilibrium. Consider that there is a rise in u from u^  to Uj. RV and NV 
shift to RV2 and NV2 respectively. As we can see, C rises in the interior equiHbrium 
ofF (i.e. from F to H), but remains unchanged in the comer equilibria ofE and G. De 
Long's NV line is a straight Une that draw through I, F and H, so we can only have 
dc 
——> 0 in De Long's model. du 
i 
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Figure Eight Bhushan s Mii1tin!e Equilibria (X = 0^ 
D Classical Equilibrium 
, - : : f 
(b,)3 -^^6¾^^^~ Bhushan s NV3 
(b2)2 - , / yV-^ N >^^ ^^ ^^ ^ Bhushan s NV2 
(b2)1 • / ^ � Bhushans NV^ T^^z ^ v 
一 (_ Noisy Equilibrium > ^ 
0 I c  
The formula ofRV is given by (18a) and (18b); Bhushan^s NV is given by (21c): 
D = b2. To the extent b2 > 0，we can see that Bhushans NV always cuts the first 
section ofRV, which is (18a); thus, classical equilibrium always exists in Bhushan's 
model. In addition, Bhushans NV may cut the second section ofRV, which is (18b), 
for up to two times, so we can have up to two noisy equilibria in Bhushan's model. 
For small b2 (i.e. (b2)1), Bhushans NV cuts the RV twice, so we have two noisy 
equilibria; for medium b2 (i.e. (b2)2), Bhushans NV cuts the RV once, so we have 
unique noisy equilibrium; for large b2 (i.e. ( b 2 ) 3 ) , Bhushans NV does not cut the RV, 




Figure Nine De Long s NV versus Bhushan s NV (X = 0^  
^ 2 ^ 2 
Note: With D 二 b, = in Bhushans Model (l + r)2 
D 
乂 De Long s NV 
"2g' E F ^ G y ^ Bhushan s NV ')ZP^v 1 
。 广 " ) 2 � 2 ^ 2 C 
(l + r)2 (l + r)2  
i 
Both De Long and Bhushan assume that i have rational expectation on price 
variance, so RV line is given by (18a) and (18b) in both De Long�s and Bhushans 
models. However, they assume different noisy expectations on price variance. De 
Long assumes that n have rational expectation on price variance, his NV is given by 
(21b): D = C, which is a 45�Une. De Long�s NV cuts the RV at G. So, he reaches a 
广 w2o"2 w2<j2 ^ 
unique noisy equilibrium at G, which is given by (F1): (C,D)= - , - ^ • 
W + r f (l + r) j 
Bhushan assumes that n have irrational expectation on price variance, his NV is 
given by (21c): D = b2, which is a horizontal straight Une. Assume that 
j ^ 2 2 
D = b, = . Bhushan�s NV can cut the RV at up to three points, E，F and G. 
2 (l + r)2 
f 2 2、 
While E is in the classical equilibrium of: (C,D)= 0,奴 ^ . ； F and G are in 
1 (1 + 广）J 
f(l-uY<r^ u^cT^ ) 
the noisy equilibrium of: {C,D)= — ：：；-,- 77- and 
L (1 + 广 ) ( l + ^ ) j 




Figure Ten Effect of Increasing u in Bhushan s Model (X = 0^  
D 
/ >r _ ^ ^ ^ X , Bhushan s NV 
Jf | I ^^^^^V2 
Ci C4 C 2 C3 C5 c  
The formula of RV Line is given by (18a) and (18b), whereas formula of 
Bhushan�s NV is given by (21c). Consider that u rises from u! to ^. The second 
section of the RV, which is (18b), shifts up from RVi to RV2. Assume that one 
classical equilibrium (i.e. C!) and two noisy equilibria (i.e. C2 and C3) exist before 
and after u rises. Increasing u has no effect on C” whereas it causes decrease 0fC2 to 
C4, and increase 0fC3 to C5 respectively. Therefore, we have conflicting comparative 




Bhushans Generalization ofDe L o n g � M o d e l (X = 0 � 
w2<j2 
Note: With D 二 b，= in Bhushans Model 
(1 + 尸)2  D 
De Long s NV 
D , 厂 ^ ^ ^ y ^ Bhushans NV^ 
Di / ^ ^ f ^ " * " " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ � Bhushans NV^ 
^ ( f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 2  
Q C4 C2 C3 Cs C  
I 
The formula o fRV line is given by (18a) and (18b), whereas the formula for w2<j2 
Bhushan�s NV is given by D = . Consider that u rises from Ui to Uj. The 
(l + r)2 
second section of the RV, which is (18b), shifts up from RV! to RV2, whereas 
Bhushans NV shifts up from Bhushans NV! to Bhushan�s NV2. If one classical 
equilibrium (i.e. Q) and two noisy equilibria (i.e. C2 and C3) exist before and after u 
rises, increasing u has no effect on Ci, whereas it causes decrease of C2 to C4, and 
increase of Q to C5 respectively. D rises from Dj to D�.Therefore, we have 
conflicting conq>arative statics in the effect on increasing u on C in Bhusharfs model. 
In addition, one ofthe multiple equilibria (i.e. C3) is constantly equal to De Long�s 
unique equiHbrium as u rises. 
j 
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Figure Twelve A IJniaue Q for Anv Eanilihriiim (X = 0 � 
D 02 De Long s NV 
r s 
0 I c  
I 
The formula o f R V is given by (18a) and (18b). Any equilibrium defmes a 
unique value of0. In De Long�s model, the formula ofNV is given by (21b): D = C. 
De Long's unique noisy equilibrium (i.e. E) defmes a unique 9 of 63 = 1. In 
Bhushan^s model, the formula o fNV is given by (21c): D = b2. Bhushan�s classical 
equilibrium (i.e. F) defmes 0 to be 0i = 00, whereas Bhushans noisy equilibria (i.e. G 




Figure Thirteen Relationship among C. D and B (X = 0 � 
D / 63 62 
I ^ , " " * " * . " " " " " { * " " " " ^ ^ j f ^ ^ m H m ^ ^ i ^ ^ _ r ^ -u ^ J 
0 ‘ C3 C2 Q c  
The formula o fRV is given by (18a) and (18b). Any given NV is normalized 
I 
into D = eC. When 0 rises continuously from 0i to 63, C falls continuously from C^  
Jf^ 
to C3； therefore, — < 0 holds strictly. However, the effect on D is non-linear. When dO 
0 rises from 0! to 02, D rises from Dj to D2； when 9 rises from 02 to 63, D fells from 







Effect of Increasing B on R* and A based on Different NEs fX = 0^  
B * N E j / 
N E 3 V 7 V R E 2 R E i ^ c 




Slope ofRE is ^ ^ ^ . When 0 rises, a falls so slope ofRE rises. For simplicity, 
a 丨 
• I 
assume that the horizontal intercept ofRE is unchanged and the intersection point of j 
RE and NE is on the first quarter. The effect of increasing 0 on B* and A depends on 
the position of NE. For NEi, B* and A fall from B*2 and A2 to B*i and A^ 
respectively; for NE2, B* and A rise from B*2 and A2 to B% and A3 respectively; for 
NE3, B* rises from B*3 to B*4 but A falls from A4 to A3. 
A 
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Figure Fifteen Relationship between Risk Premium and B fX = 0 � 
^ ] 
0 厂 C3 Q Ci C  
Risk Premium 
^ f c ^   0 I 01 � 63 6  
2y (aD\ u 
From (32), risk premium = 丄 — • From (27), a = ~ ~ - ~ " — • When 9 = r V w j u + {l-u)0 
0，D = 0 and a = 1, risk premium = 0. When 6 rises from 0 to 61, the positive effect 
ofincreasing D dominates the negative effect of decreasing a, so risk premium rises 
from 0. When 0 rises from 9i to 62, the positive effect of increasing D still dominates 
the negative effect ofdecreasing a, so risk premium rises again. As 0 rises from 0! to 
02, the negative effect of decreasing a dominates the positive effect of increasing D， 
so risk premium falls. When 0 rises from 02 to O3, the negative effect of decreasing D 
reinforces the negative effect of decreasing a, so risk premium falls. When 0 ~> 00, D 
~> 0 and a ^ 0，risk premium ^ 0. In summary, as 0 rises continuously from 0 to 00, 
risk premium rises from 0 at first and fells to 0 finally. 
A 
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Fifnire Sixteen Relationship hetween p and 6 (X = 0 � 
P  
“ " " � / ~ PL 
d^e,* X ^ / / ^ " ^ 
T ^ C ^ > ^ ^ ^ = ? = = = = ^ 
7 ^ s ^ ; - ^  
o' e  
Recall that limiting asset prices are given by (35) and (36): 
^ i ^ * d i 
A s 0 ^ O , /7 — ^ ^ ^ ; (35) ase — oo, p ^ - . (36) r r i 
i 
Derivative ofp with respect to 0 is given by (37): 
I 
>^  j ± 二 j ¥' \(iziiU — l1a2 -(1 一")e 4—. (37) 
dG l(l + r)2 n^  “ J J ru 
From (35), (36) and (37), we can distinguish between two cases: 
d + e * 
(1) For e* = Cs* (i.e. e* is small), p = Ps. Ps = ~ " ~ ^ when 0 = 0. As 6 rises, Ps 
falls at first, then rises, and fmally falls. 
d + e * 
(2) For e* 二 CL* (i.e. e* is large), p = pL. p^ 二 ~ ~ ^ when 0 = 0. As 0 rises, pL 
falls continuously. 
As 0 "^ 00, both ps and p[ ^ - • r 
A 
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Fioiire Seventeen UV I Jne CK > 0^  
贝+，「） | i ^ / u rises 
v r : ^ ^ ^ A ^ 5 
R V Line () ^^ \ 
7 l X 7 ^ + z ~ O C + X ) I 
0+厂) i 
！ 
RV Hne defines (C+X) as a relation to (D+Y) according to i s rational ！ 
expectation on retum variance. (47) gives the formula for RV line: 
{ ( C . x ) , ( D . r ) l = { [ x , ^ ] { ^ ) c . x ) [ ^ ^ - i | . ( 4 7 ) 
�L \ 」 乂 
From (47), when C = 0 or (C+X) = X, (D+Y) = 00； thus, RV has no vertical 
intercept. In addition, when C : ^ . or (C + X)=,广.+ X, D = 0; thus, RV 
{l + ry (1 + 广） 
f ^2 \ 
has a horizontal intercept of: {(C + X),{D^Y))= -~~;^ + X,0 • 
� ( l + r) y 
When u rises, RV shifts up vertically except in the horizontal intercept; when 
^ rises, RV shifts up and to the right with the horizontal intercept moving to the 




Firore Eighteen Fffect of Increasing X on RV T ine iX > 0^  
(D+Y) / RV4 
_ ^ # 
• X, = Oi 而 + Z (C+X) I 
I O2 X2 
O3 X3 
O4 ^  
Note that the diagram is drawn as if the vertical axis is X. The formula for RV 
line is given by (47): 
{(C + A ( D + & f A & ] ， t ^ ( C + ^ > T f H l . (47) 
From (47)，we can see that when X rises, (D+Y) rises. Slope ofRV Une is given by 
(48): 
舉 ” 二 r O j U L ^ f l _ 工 ) _ i l . (48) 
J(C + X) {1-Uj[2c'' (l + r)l^  CJ 
From (48), we can see that slope ofRV is decreasing in X. When X! = 0” RV = RV” 
thus (47) converges to (18a, b) (i.e. RV in the absence of fundamental risk). When X 
rises from Xi = 0! successfully to X2, X3 and X4, RV shifts up to RV2，RV3 and RV4 
respectively and the slope of RV falls successively. In addition, the origin moves 




Different NV Lines for the Same RV Line fX > 0^  
(D+Y) I ^ 0 ^ NVi 
y^ ^ 2 
F \ G ^ . . - ^ H , ^ ^ ^ > ^ " " ^ “ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ \ ^ ^ ; ^ N V 4 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ \ ^ v , 
~ o \ ~ x / (C+X) 
^ 2 
For simplicity, assume that (49) does not hold, which means: X < 之了 ( ! + y， 
so RV has an upward sloping portion between two downward sloping portions. The 
formula for RV is given by (47): 
{(C + 々 ，(Z) + r)} = { [ l $ ] ， 〔 i ) ( C + Z ) [ + 5 - l ] } . ( 4 7 ) 
The formula for NV is given by (12c): (D+Y) = a2(C+X) + b2. (12c) 
Intersection ofRV and NV determines the equilibrium values of (C+X) and (D+Y). 
When NV cuts RV at ((C + X \ (D + Y ) ) = { X , 00), we have the classical equilibrium; 
when NV cuts RV at other point, we have noisy equilibrium (e.g. E，F, G, H, I and J). 
Assume a non-downward sloping NV (i.e. ^ > 0), we draw five different NVs which 
are based on different values of a and b to show how different NVs can result in 
either unique or multiple equilibria. For NV!，we have unique noisy equilibrium (i.e. 
E); for NV2, we have two noisy equilibria (i.e. H and I); for NV3, we have three noisy 
equilibria (i.e. F, G and H); for NV4, we have unique noisy equilibrium (i.e. J); for 
NV5, we have no equilibrium. 
A 
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Fimire Twentv De I rnig s TIninue Noisy KqiiilihHiim (X > 0^ 
j m ^ ~ ~ 
| | De Long's NV • lV^ (l + " 2 1 / \ 
J / ^ \ R V Line 
0 X 4 ^ ^ ^ (C+X) 
( 1 + 尸 )  
^2 
For simplicity, assume that (49) does not hold, which means: X < 27(1 + 42， 
so RV has an upward sloping portion between two downward sloping portions. The 
formula for RV is given by (47): 
{ ( ^ + ^ " + • f A & ]，〔 T ^ ( c + H > T ? ; - ^ . ( 4 7 ) 
De Long's assumes that the perceived retum variance of i and n are equal, which in 
essence imposesaNV of(21d): (D+Y) = (C+X). Solving (41) and (21d), we can see 
that De Long's NV cuts the RV only at: 
((C.X),(Z>.K)) = ( ^ . X , ^ . X ] , (F2) 




Fffcrt nfTnrreasing u in De Lrnig s Model (X > 0 � 
¢ ^ ~ ~ ^ 
\A De Long s NV ikA • … • . • • • • • • “ • “ < > ‘ . “ ‘ “ “ “ ^ ^ “ … “ … “ . “ “ “ … … ^ ^ ^ ^ __^^^^~^ ^ ^ ^ ^ y 
y R V M R V , 
0 X (Ci+X) ( C 2 + X ) (c+x) ^
2 
For simplicity, assume that (49) does not hold, which means: X < 27(1 + ^2 , 
so RV has an upward sloping portion between two downward sloping portions. We 
consider that there is a rise in the number of n (i.e. u) from u! to 街.From (47), RV 
shifts up from: 
{ ( 。 聊 + . | 足 而 ] , 盼 + 4 + ^ , 
(RVi) 
to {(c + ^  + . { h A ] { A ) ( C + A [ + & - l ] , . 
(RV2) 
From (F2), equilibrium values of((C+X), (D+Y)) move along De Long�s NV from: 
( ( C . x x ( z > . r ) ) = [ ^ . x , | ^ . x ] 
to i c . X U D . Y ) ) - [ ^ . X , ^ . x ] . 




Fiffiire Twentv-Two Bhushan s Mult iple Fgni l ihr ia CK > 0^ 
^ 丨“^K / [ ^ / [ ^ 
(b,)3 I V ^ Bhushan s NV3 
(b2)2 I V ^ > ^ " “ “ ^ ^ ^ ~ B h u s h a n s NV^ 
(b2)1 I ^ ^ j j ^ B h u s h a n s N V i 
I i I ^ 
O2 Oi X (C+X) 
Note that the diagram is drawn as ifthe vertical axis is X. The formula for RV is 
given by (47): 
{(C + A ( Z ) + r)} = b ^ ] ， 〔 : ^ ) ( C + � [ ^ i - l ] } . ( 4 7 ) 
Bhushan�s NV is given by (21e): (D+Y) =、，which is a horizontal straight line. 
Bhushans NV cuts RV at least once and at most three times, so noisy equilibrium 
always exist in Bhushan�s model. There can be up to three noisy equilibria, 
depending on value of b2. We consider three values of、： small hj (i.e. (b2)1), 
intermediate b2 (i.e. (b2)2 ) and large b2 (i.e. (b2)3). In addition, we consider two RVs, 
depending on whether (49) holds: 
X>~^^. (49) 21{l + rf 
If (49) does not hold, RV = RV” which involves upward sloping portion. For (b2)1, 
we have unique noisy equilibrium; for (b2)2, we have three noisy equilibria; for (b2)3, 
we have unique noisy equilibrium again. If (49) holds, RV = RV2, which involves 




Fipiire T w e n t v - T h r e e 
Effect ofTncrp^sinP u in Bhiishan s Model ( \ > 0 � 
^2 
Note: With X<—~~^ 
27(l + r)2 
0 > + Y ) . 
b, \ \ ^ > ^ 0 - C ^ B h u s h a n s N V 
� I p^  
0 E F G H I J ( C + X )  
^2 
Assume that (49) does not hold, which means: X < 27(1 + ^ 2 , so RV has an 
upward sloping portion between two downward sloping portions. We consider that 
there is a rise in the number ofn (i.e. u) from u! to 他.From (47), RV shifts up from: 
{ ( 。 聊 + 咖 | 足 而 ] { 分 + 4 結 - 1 ] , 
(RVi) 
to { ( c + i )， ( D + n h f A ^ } ( Y ^ ) ( c + 4 + l f 7 - i } . 
(RV2) 
Bhushan�s NV is given by (21e): (D+Y) = b2, which is a horizontal straight line. 
Three noisy equilibria exist before and after increase in u. As u rises from u! to U2, 
retum variance rises in two of the noisy equilibria (i.e. from E to F and I to J 
respectively) but falls in one of the noisy equilibria (i.e. from H to G). 
… ^ 
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Fianri> Twentv-Four__A Vmw Q for Any Eflnilibrium (X > ¢) 
(D+Y) De Long s NV 
\ / l y ^ 2 = l 
\ / / ®3 
b. E \ / E ^ " " " N ^ , z . 
T x Z ^ z . z Z \ B ^ s h a n s NV 
身 \ 
0 � （c+x) ^
2 
For simplicity, assume that (49) does not hold, which means: X < ^^^^^y， 
so RV has an upward sloping portion between two downward sloping portions. The 
formula ofRV is given by (47). Any equiUbrium defmes a unique value of 0. In De 
Long�s mode^ the formula o f N V is given by (21d): (D+Y) = (C+X). De Longs 
unique noisy equilibrium (i.e. F) defines a unique 0 of 02 = 1. In Bhushan�model^ 
the formula o f N V is given by (21e): (D+Y) = b2. For simplicity, we assume one of 
the multiple equilibria in Bhushan�model is the same as De Long�s unique 
equilibrium. From the diagram, Bhushans noisy equilibria (i.e. E, F and G) define 0 




Rpl^finn^hip among (C+W fD+Y�and 0 (X > 0> 
(D+Y) /@3 H 0 
二 ； - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
. . • • • • . • • ‘ • • • “ • . * ^ • • • • • j ^ / _ ^ ^ ^ ^ r ^ ^ ^ ^ < ^ V 
0 ‘ (C+X)3 (C+X)2 (C+X)i ^ + X ) 
We consider two RVs, depending on whether (49) holds: 
X > g2 (49) 
27(l + r)2 
If (49) does not hold, RV = RVi, which has an upward sloping portion between two 
downward sloping portions; if (49) holds, RV = RV】，which involves downward 
sloping portion only. The formula of RV is given by (47). Any given NV is 
normaUzed into (D+Y) = 0(C+X). Consider firstly the case in which (49) does not 
hold. When © rises continuously from ©i to ©3, (C+X) M s continuously from 
(C+X)i to (C+X)3; therefore, " ( ^ 幻 < 0 holds strictly. However, the effect on 
a^ 
(D+Y) is non-Unear. When 0 rises from 0 to 0i, ff>+Y) rises from 0 to (D+Y)i； 
when 0 rises from 0^ to ©2, (D+Y) falls from (D+Y)i to (D+Y)2; when 0 rises from 
©2 to © 3 , (D+Y) rises from (D+Y)2 to (D+Y)3. There fore ,辦二^) is first positive, 
then negative, and fmally positive. In case that (49) holds, when 0 rises continuously 
d(C + ^\ 
from ©1 to ©3，（C+X) falls but (D+Y) rises constantly. Therefore, - ^ ~ " < 0 and 





Rplationshin hptween Risk Premium and ¢^  (X > 0^   
(D+Y) ®4 
r P G 
0 � （C+X) 
Risk Premium  
Risk Premium (2) \ 
^ f J L ] — z = L \ 二 
尸 ” ^ _ _ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ; ; ; ; ^ i ^ ^ 
y^^^"^^^""^«|s^«^^<^X^\ Risk Premium (1) 
^ 01 02 03 ©4 ® 
2y fB(D + Y)^ u 
From (59), risk premium = y | ^ - ^ ^ ~ " - J • From (54)，p = " + (!―咖• 
We have the following limiting values for risk premium:  
As © "^ 0, (D+Y) ^ 0 and P ^ 1，so risk premiums 0; 
2rf X ^ 
As 0 "> 00, (D+Y) ^ 00 and p ^ 0, but risk premium ^ - | ^ j ^ J • 
As 0 rises between 0 and oo, p M s ; (D+Y) either rises at first, then fells and finally 
rises, or rises continuously. Thus, p has (-) effect, whereas (D+Y) has either (+，-，+) 
or (+) effect on risk premiiun. We have three possible outcomes:  
(A): (+) effect ofrising (D+Y) dominates (-) effect offalling p; risk premium rises; 
(B): (+) effect ofrising (D+Y) is dominated (-) effect of Ming P; risk premium falls; 
(C): (-) effect offalling p + Y ) reinforces (-) effect offalling p; risk premium falls. 
^ 
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We consider two RVs, depending on whether (49 ) holds: 
2 
X » ~ ~ - (49 ) where' »^ means' sufficiently larger thari • 
27(l + r)2   
If(49) does not hold, RV = RV” which has an upward sloping (or slightly downward 
sloping) portion between two downward sloping portions; 
If(49) holds, RV = RV2, which involves downward sloping portion only.  
(1) ff (49 ) does not hold fflVi): As 0 rises:  
(1) from 0 to ©1, we have outcome (A); (ii) from G, to ©2, we have outcome (B); 
(ii) from ©2 to 03，we have outcome (C); (iv) from 63 to €>4，we have outcome (B); 
(v) from 04 onwards, we have outcome (A).  
(Note that i fRV has slightly downward sloping portion, we have, in order, outcome 
(A), then outcome (B), and finally outcome (A) again). 
Thus, as 0 rises continuously from 0 to 00, risk premium first rises, then falls, and 
fmally rises again (i.e. Risk Premium(l)). 
(2)If(49 )h0lds(RV2):  
As Q rises from 0 to oo, we constantly have outcome (A).  
Thus, as 0 rises continuously from 0 to 00, risk premium constantly rises (i.e. 
Risk Premium (2)). 
^ 
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FiPiire Twcntv-Seven Ri>lationshin hetween n and 0 (X > 0 � 
^ ^ L / H / H 
, : ) ^ ¾ 
A i-wJ 
"“^^t" © 
Recall that Umiting asset prices are given by (62) and (63): 
d + e* 八 l f r 2yX^ " , � 
A s e — 0 ， p ^ ^ ^ ^ \ (62) a s 0 ^ o o , p ^ - d - — . (63) r ry i-uj 
Derivative ofp with respect to 0 is given by (64): 
皇二| 2ycj' r r l z J i ] 2 e - l ] p ' - ( l - u ) e * - 2 y x l ^ , (64) 
d e [ ( l + r ) ' [ l , u j J r u 
We consider two values of X: X is large (i.e. X J and X is small (i.e. Xs). 
Similarly, we consider two values ofe*: e* is large (i.e. A*) and e* is small (i.e. Cs*). 
From (62), (63) and (64)，we can distinguish between four cases: 
d + e * 
(1) For X = Xs and e* 二 es*, p = Pss. Pss 二 ~ 六 when 0 = 0. As 0 rises, Pss falls 
at first, then rises, and fmaUy falls. 
j + g * 
(2) For X = Xs and e* 二 CL*, p = psL- PsL 二 ———when 0 = 0. As 9 rises, PsL M\s r 
continuously. d + £ * 
(3) For X = XL and e* = Cg*, p = pLs. Pzs = ~ " 六 when 0 = 0. As 0 rises, p^ s 
falls continuously. 
d + ^ * 
(4) X = Xx and e* = Cr*, p = Pu. Pu. = — when 0 = 0. As 9 rises, pL M s r 
continuously. 
j l f ^ 2yX^ 





Derivation and Mtuition: Price is Weighted Average - (10) 
Substituting (8a) and (8b) to (9): 
J ^ - ( i + , M + ( i _ " ) [ i z i L t ! j g ^ ] = i . L ^rD J L 2jc J 
Solving pt in terms of A, B, C and D: 
uC[B-(l+r)pJ + (l-u)D[A-(l+r)pJ = 2yCD 
uCB + (l-u)DA - [uC+(l-u)D](l+r)Pt = 2yCD 
二 1 [r uC ] f i �（ l - ^ Q i ) ] �2 [ CD T 
凡二17^1 uC + a-u)D + uC + (l-u)D y tiC^(l-u)B 
、L 」 ^ ^ ^ 乂 
广 广 \^  
Let a = 广 : C ; ; ^ = ^ o 5 + ( l - a ) ^ - 2 y ^ . (10) uC + Qi-u)D 1 + r [ ^ u ) 
To see how i and n have symmetric roles in price determination, (10) can be 
rewritten as: 
丫 ^ 1 { ^^ 1 ( 丫 
A = - ^ “ ^ 五+ ~ " 1 “ ^ ^ - 2 y ^ “ \ ~ ~ • (A1) ^^  l + r u \-u u l-u u \-u — + — + — + \D C j yD C j KD C J_ 
According to (A1), asset price is a weighted average of investors' beliefs in 
which (.. .)B+( •. .)A is the weighted expected return, and 2y( • •.) is the weighted risk 
premium. The weights themselves are determined by relative numbers (u and l-u) 
and perceived price variances (C and D) of investors. For examples: B-2yD 
When u = 1 , 八 = ―；price reflects only beliefs of n who perceives that 
l + r 
^ 2yC 
there is price risk in the market. When u = 0, p^  = — ； price reflects only 
l + r 
beliefs of i who perceives that there is price risk in the market. When D = 0, 
B 
Pt = ； price reflects only beliefs of n who perceives that there is no price risk in 
l + r 
^ 
the market. When C = 0，p^ = y ^ ; price reflects only beliefs of i who perceives 
that there is no price risk in the market. 
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Appendix Two Derivation of RE Line - (14) 
Substituting B = B^with mean B* into (8), we have: 
1 f c d ) \ Pt= i o 5 , + ( l - a ) ^ - 2 y — ‘ l + r V w J 
广 , 、、 
^ _ L a ( 5 5* ) + - ] a B * + ( l - a M - 2 r [ - | . (13) l + r l + r �u ) 
Note that A is the expected retum in rational expectation, which is [tpt+i +A+i]-
Solving recursively, we have: 
= ^ ^ ^ + — | _ 一 4 就 1 ] - 2 判 
l + r l + r �u j 
V ^ 
二"(召广沪)+丄 / �U * + ( l - a ) ^ - 2 r f ^ l j 
l + r l + r 1 f l - a ] V w J 1 -
_ u+广人 a(B,-B*) 1 f ^ ^ ,1 � j �f a D ^ l , • � � =-^ - + iaB*+{l-a)d-2y ——> (A2) 
l + r r+a v奴 7 
V. 身 
r f �� 
Then，A 二 [,Vt^x +A+i] = ~ ^ ] a 5 * +(1 -a)d-2y{ — 1 + d• (14) 
r + a [ �u ) 
Appendix Three 
Equilibrium Values ofA and B - (13a)，(13b) & (13c) 
Substituting (12a) into (A2), we have: 
= • - 一) ^ _ L _ f [ ^ ^ + e 小 ( 1 - a)d - 2yf ^ ] > l + r r + a V u J 
=仅 (广 ) + 丄 一 [ “ 1 ( , 凡 + 1 + , � + ^ *]+ ( l _ a ) j - 2 y f ^ l > l + r r + a [ \ u J 
广 / \^ 
= ^ | ^ j ; ^ + _ 2 _ j ^ " A + i + a e * + [ ( l - o O + a a i ^ f - 2 y f A ) > l + r r + a [ V ^ J, 
=咖 - e * ) + � _ L _ ^ Le-4(l-a) + cui,]d-2y(^]^ 
l + r r + a ^_f aa^ | V ^ / _ U+«J_ 
二咖一“”+_ _ 1 _ _ L - 4 { l - a ) + aa,]d-2r(^^. (15) 
l + r r + a-aa. v u � 
J> V. ^ 
(15) is exactly in the form of (4) that we mentioned in the beginning of this 
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paper. Accordingly, [weighted disturbance]” [weighted discount factor], [weighted 
perceived retum] and [weighted risk premium] in (4) are interpreted respectively as 
( d ) \ 
a(et-e)，(r + a_aai)，{ae* + [(l-a)+aai]d}and 2y ——in (15). Careful inspection 
V u ) 
of(15) tells us how a” e* and Ct in (12a) affects price when a is taken as constant. 
Weighted discount factor can be rewritten as {(l+r)- [(l-a)+aaJ}; it tells the way 
that, when a is taken as constant, how a! affects the discount factor as we solve (A2) 
recursively. Weighted perceived retum can be rewritten as [a(aid+e*) + (l-a)d]; it 
tells us the fect that after we solve (A2) recursively, expected retum is equal to the 
weighted average o f effective perceived dividends' per period. 
(15) is the equilibrium price in our model conditional on C and D, from 
which we can obtain the equilibrium values of A，B*，and B^  conditional on C and D: 1 r fcLD\ 
^ , A + i + , " / + i = " W * + [ ( l - « ) + «flfi]fi?-27 一 \^d; (16a) r + a-aa^ [ V 狄). 
f \ ,CKDYl B* = a,A + e* = a, {ae*^[{l-d)^aa^]i-2y[— Ue*; (16b) 
{r + a-aaJ[ V w Jj 
f 1 \( r«£)YI 
B, =a,A + e, =a, ]cxe*+[(l-oO + oai^/-2y ——\ + e^. (16c) 
{r + a-aaJ[ ^ u )] 
Appendix Four Derivation ofRV Line - (18a) and (18b) 
From (17)，we can see that: 
When C = D = 0，a is not defined, so (C, D) = (0, 0) is not included in the RV line; 
When C = 0 and D > 0，a = 0 is defmed, so 
(C, D) = (0, (0, o o ] ) (18a) is a part ofthe RV line. 
When C > 0， 
_ i 7 
C = � " C T a 2 
" [ M C + ( l -M)Z)J (l + r)2 
[uC + (l-u)Df =u'C-^^ L V J (l + r)' 
(l-ufD^ +2u{l-u)CD + u^C^ ="2c(i::)2  
/ N rv \2 / \2 2 
D^^2 Ji-]cD+ 1 ^ 1 c^- — ] c - ^ =0 K^-uJ [ U - w y U - w ; ( l + r ) _ 
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/ \ / ^ \2 厂 1 ^2 -
D ^ J ^ ] c o 4 - ] C2 l - l 7 7 ^ =0 
{l-uJ {l-uJ L C ( l + r)2_ 
By the quadratic formula: 
/ � [} ^ —f \ 2 � 1 r -
^ _ O c i f ^ l C ^ - 7 ^ 1 C2 1 - 1 ^ 
U - w J ^ U - w j U - w J L c ( 1 + r ) 2 _ 
二 抖 土 1 斗 2 [ 去 _ ^ ] [\-u) ^ll-tiJ [C(l + r f _ 
- _ r _ i ^ v ^ r _ i L _ u _ L ^ i 
—{l-u) ~[l-u) Lc�.5(l + r)_ 
D 二 - l - ^ l c — +1 < 0 is rejected for price variance is non-negative. In 
{l-uJ [ C ' ' (1 + r ) � 
2 ^2 
addition,whenC= - , D = 0;when0<C< - ~ ~ — , D > 0. Therefore: 
(l + r)2 (1 + , ) 
(�=h^][^)i^^A} _ ^ a P - ofthe 
uC . 
RV line in which a 二 is defined. 
uC + (l-u)D 
Appendix Five 
De Longs Model- Derivation of(22), (23) and (24) 
Method One- By (21a)，(21b)，（14)，（18a，b) and (13) 
Firstly, from (21b) we have: a = — 二 u and so — = D. (A3) 
uC + (1 - u)D u 
Secondly, from (21a)，we have: a(B,-B^) = u(e,-Q*) (A4) 
Thirdly, we know that NV does not cut the first section ofRV since (21b) and (18a) 
cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Then, we know from (21b) and (18b) that when 
NV cut the second section ofRV, (20) follows: 
c J ^ U _ L _ _ ^ _ i " 
h-uJ L c � . 5 ( l + r ) _ 
1 - w 1 1 a + l = - x r u C " 5 ( l + r ) 
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C = D = ^ f ^ , (23) 
(l + r)2 
Fourthly, substituting (21a) into (14), we have: 
r f v^  
A = - ^ l a { A + e*) + {X-a)d-2y[—\\ + d r+a \ u ) 
i \ 一~—1 = -^lae * +{l-a)d — 2yf - l l + d � r + a j r + a [ V ^ 义 
r ( , ) v ^ ( V 
A = -< ae* +(l-a)d-2y — >+ ^^^ d r { \ u )] \ r ； 
r f x^  
=-< ae^+(l + r)d-2y ——>. r V u ) 
r f(y^J^ \^  
Then, a 5 * + ( l - a ) ^ = - i a e * + ( l + r)t3?-2y[—]l + ae* 
r { V u ) ] 
1 f,i V . 力 � (a Z ) Y 
=-< (1 + r)(ae * +d) - 2y ——\ 
r 1 V u ) \ 
r 2 2 � 
= i ( l + r ) ( " e * + ^ 0 - 2 y ^ ^ ^ . (A5) r (l + r)^ 
‘ 乂 
Finally, substituting (A3), (23), (A4) and (A5) into (13)，(22) foUows: 
u(e -e*^ 1 f l � w2<j2 1 "2 2 ^ e , g ; _ | _ l (i + ^ ) ( j , e * + 6 / ) - 2 y - ? ^ ^ - 2 y - ~ ~ -Pt l + r l + r]r ^ 八 (l + r)' (1 + 0 
L 匕 」 乂 
u{e, -e*) 1 f l + r T * , . �u W 1 二~^ "^^  - + < (ue*+d)-2y 7 > 
l + r l + r[ r [ (1 + 0 丄 
^ t ^ ( e ^ - e V _ ^ l f , ^ ^ J ^ l (22) 
l + r r [ (l + ^ 2 j 
1 — 2 2 
From (22), expected price (p) is: p = - ue*+d-2y-———• (24) r |_ (1 + r ) 
Method Two- By (21b), (18a，b) and (15) 
Since a! = 1 in De Long's mode^ (15) becomes: 
a(e, - e * ) 1 . , 。 f a D ^ l ,八。 
n =-^ - + -{ae*+d-2y — >. (A6) 
“ l + r r y u j 
V � , J 
From(21b), a = u. (A3) 
2 2 
From(21b)and(18a,b), C = D=广 ^^ ^ • (23) 
(1 + 严) 
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Substituting (A3) and (23) into (A6), we have (22) and (24). 
Appendix Six 
Bhushan�s Model- Derivation of (25a, b，c) and (26a, b，c) 
To save efforts，we use Method Two hereafter for the derivation of 
equilibrium. Firstly, we factorizing (17) in order to express of C in terms ofD: 
C — [ " C ]2 g 2 
[wC + (l-w)i)J (l + rf 
[uC + (1 - u)Df C = u'C' -^% L V (l + r)2 
2 
(1 - w)2 Z)2 + 2u(l - u)CD + u'C' ] c = u'C' - ^ ^ 
r � � 2 1 
lu'C+ 2u{l-u)D-u'-^^ C + (l-ufD' }C = 0 
(l + r)2 
� L J 乂 
.C2 J l ( l z J i ] D - - ^ ] c + ( l z l X D ' ] c = 0, (A7) ^ �u j (l + r)2 V ^ ； 
V L 乂 
(A7) is just anther expression of (18a, b); both of them represent the RV Une. 
2 
Substituting D 二 b^ = jCJ ^ into (A7), we have: 
(1 + r) 
“ r 2 "I � 2 "|2 
<C'^ 2 w ( l - w ) - ^ - ~ 5 l _ y C^u\\-uf - ^ ic = 0 � （l + r)2 (l + r)2_ (l + r ) ' 
、 乂 
^ 2 �一 f 1 
C ' + [ 2 w ( l - w ) - 1 ] - ^ ^ C + u^(1 - u ^ - ^ \C = 0 . (A8) 
L � � ( 1 + ^0 _(l + r ) _ 
‘ 乂 
Factorizing {••} by the quadratic formula: 
- [ 2 , ( l - , ) - l ] ^ i # M l - , ) - l ] ^ } - 4 . ^ ( l - ) { ^ 
C = 2 
-[2u{l - u) 一 1 ] - ^ ^ 土 ； ； ^ 如 ( 1 一 u ) 一 l)]2 - 4u' (1 - u)2 
= (1 + r) (1 + 0 _ -
92 
- [ 2 w ( l - u) 一 1] - ^ 士 “ ^ ^][2u(l - u) — 1 + 2u(l - u)] [2u(l - u) -1 一 2u(l 一 u)]  
(l + r ) (1 + 0 
= “ 2 
-[2u(l - u) - 1 ] ^ ^ ± ^ ^ V[4^(1 - u) -1)](-1) 
(1 + r ) (1 + 0 
二 2 
2 2  
-[2u(l 一 u) - 1 ] ~ ^ ^ ± 7 7 ^ > / [ l - 4u + 4u'  
(1 + r ) (1 + 0 
一 2 
- [ 2 . ( 1 - . ) - 1 ] ^ ± ^ ( 1 - 2 . ) 
一 2 
2 
[(1 一 2u) + 2u' 士 (1 一 2w)] r 
二 (1 + 尸） 
一 2 
2 w V [ l - 2 w + w ' > 7 ' 二 -or- 1  2(l + r)2 (i + r)2 
= J f ! ^ o , ^ k : i l ^ . (A9) 
(l + r)2 (l + r)2 
Substituting (A9) into (A8), we have: 
[ C - 4 ] [ C - " ) 2 : 2 ] c = 0 , _ (l + r)2jL (l + r)2 J 
and the three equilibrium price variances are: 
C = 0, C = " 2 广 and C = (^一…‘了‘ (25a), (25b), and (25c) 
(l + r ) 2 ( 1 + 广 ) 
Like De Long's mode^ a^  = 1 in Bhushans model, so we can substitute the 
values o f a and D into (A6) under (25a), (25b) and (25c) to get equilibrium prices for 
those three cases respectively: 
For (25a)，a = 0, p, = — ； (26a) r 
For(25b),a = u, " ( g , - � l u e * + d - 2 y - ^ ^ ^ ； (26b) 
l + A* r\_ (1 + r ) 
F o r ( 2 5 c ) , a = l - u , A = ( l - ， _ 〜 4 ( l - " ) e * + f 2 y ^ ^ ^ ] . (26c) 
1 + r r (1 + r ) 
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Appendix Seven Effect of Licreasing 9 on p - (33) 
Differentiating (32) with respect to 0，keeping ^ and ^ as constants, we ctu ctu 
have: 
dp _ ( e * ^ ^ _ ( ^ p ^ ^ J ^ ^ ^ 
~M~[~7) de t r u)de L r u)dO 
_ 'e*)da _(2y D^da + f a^tZP" 
“C^)~M~\^^)lde \D)de 
—'它*)化一「互幻「1+阅到竺 
“^ r )dO t r u J[ \D)da\de 
j M r ^ - T i + f - l - ] | - - (Aio) 
V r ) � r u Jl �i)y(^/a�j^/^ 
F r o m ( A 1 0 ) , ^ < 0 i f . * > ^ f l ^ ^ ^ l (33) � 乃 dO u 1 Dda) 
Appendix Eight 
Effect ofMcreasing 9 on p - (35)，(36) and (37) 
(i) Limiting p as 0 = 0 and 6 = oo 
Substituting a = — — ^ ~ " — into (34)，we have: u + (l-u)0 
^ a L ^ - _ ^ ^ ^ f — — ^ ¾ ~ ^ ~ ^ , 1 1 (All) 
P r w + (l-w)6> u + (1 -w)6>[[u + (1 -u)Of (1 + rf )\ 
(All) is the reduced form equilibrium of expected price in the absence of 
fundamental risk when the NV line is normalized to D = 0C and NE is represented 
by (21a). It can be used to study the effect of increasing 9 on p. We can see the 
limiting expected price when 0 = 0 and oo： 
As e ^ 0 , / 7 ^ ^ i ^ ; (35) r 
e ^ o o , p ^ - . (36) r 
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(ii) Effect on increasing 0 on p 
It is mathematically easier to differentiate (34) instead of (All) . Differentiating (34) 
with respect to 0, we have: 
dp e*da 2y “ a^a^ daO ^ 7Ba^cj^ da (八工之） 
5 = 7""^_7i7L(l + r)2 dQ (l + r)2 de\' 
Note that: 
^ ^ ± [ _ _ ^ _ _ L - " ( 1 - " ) = - f ^ ) a 2 ; (A13) 
dQ deyu^{X-u^) [w + (l-w)0]2 � “ j 
^ _ A i 沾 ^_u[u + {X-u^]-ue{X-u)_ "2 -a2 (Ai4) 
~^~~m\u + {\-u)e) [w + ( l - w ) 0 ] 2 " [ w + ( l - w ) 0 ] . 
Substituting (A13) and (A14) into (A12), we have: 
dp fl-wV* 2 2y�cz2cy2 (X-u^7Ba^. 上= a^ -_ ' - -a 7 ^ a 
de V w y r r w [ ( l + r ) ' �u ； (l + r ) ' 
= _ 问 々 _ 2 r a - r . 一问20«厂 
( u j r ru(l + ry [ V " J 
二 -问〜 2 r c ^ - / r f l^ l2e-1V 
V “ J r ru{X + r) [1, u J _ 
. / _ M ! _ r r \ z A ^ - i l a ^ _ ( 1 _ ^ ) , 4 ^ . (37) (l + r)2 L � w ； � J ru 
Since we assume e* > 0，the 2°^  term in { •••} is definitely negative. The sign 
w 
of (37) then depends solely on the sign of the 1访 term. When B < —~~-，the 1幼 2(1 — u) 
term is negative. Since all terms in {...} are n e g a t i v e ,要 is negative. When uu 
e > ~ ~ - ~ ~ , the 1访 term is positive. Ife* is small, the positive effect of the 1鍵 term 2(l-w) 
dominates the negative effect of the 2°^  t e r m ;宴 is positive; if e* is large, the dQ 
positive effect ofthe 1^ term is dominated by the negative effect of the 2"^  term; ^ 
is negative. When 0 rises further, the 1该 term falls as the a^ in the 1幼 term fells 
continuously. Up to some point, the positive effect of the 1鍵 term is dominated by the 




Derivation and Muition: Price is Weighted Average- (40) 
Substituting (39a) and (39b) to the market clearing condition of(9) 
4"万一(1+咖+(1-^0^-(1+咖,1=1. 
[ 2 r ( D ^ Y ) � �1 2r(C + X) J 
Solving p, in terms of A，B，(C+X) and (D+Y): 
u(C+X)P-(l+r)pJ + (l-u)(D+Y)[A-(l+r)pJ 二 2Y(C+X)(D+Y) 
u(C+X)B + (l-u)(D+Y)A _ [u(C+X)+(l-u)(D+Y)](l+r)p, = 2y(C+X)(D+Y) 
r u(c+x) L+r (i-")(D+r) \ i 
1 [ w ( C + x ) + ( i - w ) ( Z ) + r ) J [ i / ( c + z ) + ( i - w ) ( z ) + r ) j ^ 
Pt "T+7^ � (C + X)(D + 7) 1 
- y u{C + X) + {\-u\D + Y)\ 
‘ ^ 
Let 0二 "(C + 义) ,we have: 
P u(C + X ) + ( l - u ) ( D + F ) ' 
, 广 ，、 
^ J ^ j p B + ( l - P ) A - 2 r 附 + r ) (40) l + r 1 L « �J 
To see how i and n have symmetric roles in price determination, (40) can be 
rewritten as: 
f 丄 ） f j ^ ) r Y 
p = 丄 _ ^ ~ 5 + ~ M _ _ A-2r ——？^——• 
l+r] u l-u u I \-u u I \-u 
i^D + 7^C + xJ [n + Y cTxJ [o + Y c + x / 
(A15) 
According to (A15), asset price is a weighted average of investors�beliefs in 
which (...)B+(...)A is the weighted expected return and 2y(...) is the weighted risk 
premium. The weights themselves are determined by relative numbers (u and l-u) 
and perceived return variances ((C+X) and (D+Y)) of investors. 
Similar to Appendix Two in which there is no fundamental risk, when u = 1, 
Pt = B - 2 K D + ” ； price reflects only beliefs of n who believes that there are both 
^ l + r ‘ 
^ A-2r(C + X ) . 
price risk and dividend risk in the market. When u = 0, p, = — ； pnce 
reflects only beliefs o f iwho believes that there are both price risk and dividend risk 
in the market. 
Unlike Appendix Two, when either D = 0 or C = 0，price reflects both i s and 
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n s beliefs, because investors are unwilling to bet infmitely against each other if they 
have to bear fundamental risk, even if they do not have to bear any price risk in 
trading the risky asset. When D = 0, the weight for n is larger and that for i is smaller, 
given y > ^ ^. When C = 0，the weight for n is smaller and that for i is larger, 
. 1-w 1-w 
given > . ^ X C + X 
Appendix Ten 
Classical Equilibrium with Fundamental Risk- (41) 
Jn the classical equilibrium, n has no influence on price of the risky asset. 
Therefore, price would be set in a level as if there is no n in the model (i.e. either u = 
0，B-(l^)pt = 0，or (D+Y) = oo) . From the market clearing condition of (9): 
(l-u)A/ = 1 
p - ( l + 0 ^ = l 
�X 2y(C + X) J 
凡 = 丄 [ 乂 一 ^ ^ ] . 
t 1+rL 1-w _ 
Recall that A is the expected retum in rational expectation, i.e. A = tpt+i+A+i: 
1 � j 2y (C + X ) l Pt =-"~~ ,^+i+,<+i • 
1+r 1-w 
Solving recursively: 
凡斗 - M ^ ] . 
r [ 1-w 
Since n has no influence on price, price variance is not conditional on the variance of 
noise (i.e. price is a martingale, or C = 0): 
d \( 2y \ … � 
P t = 产 . (41). r r\^-u) 
Appendix Eleven Derivation ofRE Line- (43) 
Substituting B = B^  with mean B* Vt into (40)，we have: 
A = — { ^ + ( l | 4 » t Z l ] } 
1 + r [ L « 」J 
=附 -們 +丄 | @ 4 -州 - 2 7 ^ 1 ^ 1 1 . (42) 
1+r l+r u 
V ^ "*乂 
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Note that A is the expected retum in rational expectation, which is GPt+i + A+i): 
= ^ ^ + — | l ) _ 2 y � f f i ^ ] l . 
1 + r 1 + r [ L u 」 
Solving recursively, we have: 
/ � 
m ^ ^ 1 { _ i 4 ^ ^ ^ ] } 
l + r 1 + r 1 l-j3 u _ 
上 、 
V 1 + r J 
= _ 厂 沪 ) + 丄 { 爬 + ( 1 普 2 7 [ ^ ^ 1 1 . (A16) 
1+r r+p[ L u 」 
Then，A=p,,,+,d,^, = ^ \ p B * H l - P ) d - 2 r \ ^ ^ ^ ^ ] \ + d . (43) 
r + p [ L u � 
Appendix Twelve 
Equilibrium Values ofA and B - (44)，（45a)，(45b) and (45c) 
Substituting (12a) into (A16), we have: 
= ^ ^ + _ 1 ^ + 印 ( 1 一 州 一 2 7 ^ ^ ] 1 
1 + r r + p 1 L w � 
= ¥ + _ ^ + 昨 ( 1 — 州 _ 2 7 ^ 1 ^ ] 1 
1 + r r + p 1 L w 」 
= ^ ^ + • ^ ^ • + / 3 一 + ( 1 - 沖 於 2 7 ^ ± ^ 4 
1 + r r + p L u 」， 
Solving recursively, we have: 
f \ 
p(e, - e * ) 1 1 f^ ^ ,1 ^ o � j � j 8 C D + 7 ) l l A = ^ ~ - + ~~- " ^ ^ ]pe*+(l-p + pa,)d-2y ^——'-\ 
1 + r r + P 1 RGi [ L w � 
1 " ^ J 
= ^ ^ ^ + ^ ^ 卢 〜 1 —卢 + 如 1 ) 厂 4 £ 1 ^ 1 } (44) 
1 + r r + p-pa, [ L ^ 」J 
(44) is exactly in the form of (4) that we mentioned in the introduction. 
Accordingly, [weighted disturbance]” [weighted discount fector], [weighted 
perceived retum], and [weighted risk premium] in (4) are expressed as p(et_e*), (r+P-
pai), [pe*+(l-p+pai)d], and 2y 例乃 + ^ in(44)respectively. 
L ^ J 
In addition, (44) is the equilibrium price in our model conditional on (C+X) 
and ^)+Y), from which we can solve for the equilibrium values of A，B* and B^  
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conditional on (C+X) and (D+Y): 
A=tP^ +A+i = r^p-pa{^' * +[(1 -好)+ 如1 ^  一 2 r [ ^ ^ ^ ^ ] | + d 
1 (45a) 
5* = «1乂 + 一二《 /~ ~ i - ^ Y j 8 e * + [ ( l - i 3 ) + J3^i>^-2y 帅 + r ) l ^ a , d + e* 
{ r ^ f i - ^ J [ L « �J 
(45b) 
B, 二《1乂 + 忍 , = a I ~ ~ ^ ^ - l j f c * +[(1 - P) + Pch}i - 2 y � ( D , , + f ) l + a,d + e, 
{r + fi-^J[ L w � J 
(45c) 
Appendix Thirteen Derivation ofRV Line- (47) 
Factorization upon (46): 
一 2 "I 2 
[u{C + X) + (l-u){D + Y)f=u' (C+c” ^ ^ 
fC7 + J^? 0"2 
(1 - uf {D + Yf + 2u{l - u)(C + X)(D + Y) + w^  (C + Xf = u' ^ -^^^ 
( w ) 2 + [ 2 p q ( c + 4 z ) + r ) + [ f ^ c + z ) 2 - f + T ^ ^ ^ = o 
\ , l l - w / \l-uJ U - w； c (l + r) 
_ \ � L 
— + [ 2 f e > H ( � � f e l ( C + � { l — * ^ - - 0 
By the quadratic formula, we have:  
2 
- 2 ( + ) ( C + Z ) ± � [ 2 ( ^ ) ( C + X)]^ - 4 ( ^ ) 2 ( C + J Q 2 [ 1 - + ^ ^ ] 
l-u \ \-U \-U 1 U + rJ 
CD + D = ^  
= - ( & ) ( C + ^ j ( & ) ( C + ^ - ( & ) 2 ( C + ^ [ l - | $ ] 
= - ( T ^ ) ( c + ^ | l ^ ) 2 ( c + ^ [ * & ] 
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= - ( 1 ^ (〔 +単 ( 1 ^ (〔 +烈 + 1 ? 7 ] . 
(D + 7) = - ( ^ )(C + X)\————+ 1] is rejected for retum variance is non-\ ， l _ M C05 l + r 
^ 2 
negative. In addition, when X < (C + X) < (^  + 力！ + X，(D+Y) > 0. Therefore: 
{ ( c + � , ( D + r ) } = { [ A & ] , � g ( c + z ) [ + 5 - i ] } . ( 4 7 ) 
is the RV line in the presence of fundamental risk. 
Appendix Fourteen 
Effects ofMcreasing X on RV Line- (48) and (49) 
八, , d ( D + Y) d(D + Y ) . 
Differentiate (47) with respect to (C+X), and note that • + �= " " • — ~ " smce 
X is regarded as constant during the calculation: 
柳 + n = r o j [ _ L ^ - i i + ( c + x { - 丄 ) 丄 丄 > 
d(C + X ) U - w J l k " ' l + ^  J A 2 j c i . 5 l + r j 
_ r O J _ L ^ _ 1 _ i ( c + 1 ) 丄 丄 丄 1 
" U - J l C ^ - M + r 2^ ^ C C ^ M + rJ 
— ‘ u ) [ 1 _ _ ^ � 1 — 1 C + X l _ 1�^ 
= , T ^ J l ^ T 7 7 L ~ 2 c J " / 
4 — l l 4 . — [ i - - f i - - l l - 4 
U-wJlC®- 1 + rL 2 �C j J 
= P ^ l l i f l - l l - l l (48) 
U - w J L 2 C ' ' l + r l c ) J 
From (48), we know that when X rises, the slope ofRV line falls. 
Differentiating (48) with respect to (C+X) and set the resulting derivative 
equal to zero, we can search for the point of maximum slope ofthe RV Une: 
l f u ) a [[^ n 1 f 3 ^ X 1 二 ^ 
2 t r ^ J r H 7 [ t ~ 2 j ^ ~ t ~ 2 j ^ J ~ 
r _ n _ L r i _ ^ i . o l 2 j c " L C j 
C = 3X (A17) 
(A17) indicate that when C = 3X, or (C+X) = 4X, the slope ofRV line is 
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maximized. Substituting (A17) into (48), we can see that when C = 3X: 
d(D+Y) 二 f u |r 1 y a 1 一 i_ 
d{C + X ) ' [ ^ ) U ^ J l + r 3 . 
u. ~* 
For this maximum slope to be negative, we need: 
� , 1 � 0 . 5 1 “ 1 <T 1 1 ^  1 <0,or {3XJ l+r3 
X>~^^. (49) 27(l + r)2 
(49) indicates that when X is large, RV is negatively sloping for all values ofC. 
Normalizing the values of ~ ^ and ~ ^ to 1. (48) and (49) become: 1-u l + r 
. ^ i R l I l = l J - f l - - ] - l and X > - = 0.037 respectively. If (49) d(C + X) 2 C ' 1 C j 27 
does not hold, for example, when X = 0.01, slope ofRV as C rises is: 
^ ^ d(D + F) � 
A s C = 0, — ^ = -oo< 0 ; 
， d(C + X) 
C = 0.0001， ^ 2 = i ( 1 0 0 ) ( - 9 9 ) - 1 < 0； d(C +X) 2 
^ AA, d{D + Y) l f 1 Y 2) 1 A 
C = 0.03, — - = ^ - - - l > 0 ; 
, d(C + X) 21^0.03�.5人 3j
c = 1 0 0 , 耶 + ^ = - f - l ( 0 . 9 9 9 9 ) - 1 < 0 . (A18) d(C + X) 2{l0) 
(A18) indicates that when X is small, in the sense that (49) does not hold, slope of 
RV line is first negative, then positive, and then negative again as C rises. 
Appendix Fifteen 
De Longs Model- Derivation of(50), (51) and (52) 
Method One- By (21a)，(21d), (43)，(47) and (42) 
Firstly,from(21dXwehave: ^ + ^ — i z ^ + r ) = " * 
_ + � Z ) + r ) . (A19) u 
Secondly, from (21a), we have: P(B,-B*) = u(e,-e*). (A20) 
Thirdly, from (21d) and (47)，we have: 
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^ c ^ x ) = { ^ ] ( c ^ x { ^ ^ - i yl-u) lC l+A- _ 
l z f i + i = _ L i 
u C®' 1 + r 
C = D = ^ ^ or (C^X) = (D^Y) = ^ ^ + X. (51) 
(l + r)2 (1 + 广） 
Fourthly, substituting (21a) into (43), we have: 
A = - ^ l p ( A + e*) + (1 - P)d - ly[^^^^^A +d r + fil V w J_ 
• - 丄 1 = 丄 [ 恤 * + ( 1 普 2 7 ^ ^ ^ 爪 " 
1 r^PJ r + ^l 、 “ Jl 
4 * * + " ) " o { ^ ^ K l " 
r L V w >/�V f y 
= 'Jpe*Hl^r)ci-2r(^^]. r L V u 力 
1 � /^ i0(Z) + F)VI 
Then, pB*^l-p)A = - Pe*+(l + r)d-2y ^ +Pe* 
r L V u J_ 
1 � r 0 ( D + r ) Y =-(l + r)(Pe*+d)-2y ^ )-r L V u )_ � ( 2 2 Y =1 {X + r){m*+d)-2y 权 ^ , +X . (A21) 
r [ U l + 0 ). 
Substituting (A19), (A20), (51) and (A21) into (42), (50) follows: 
二 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 丄 仏 [ ^ ^ + 1]] [ ^ ^ + 1). 
P' 1 + r l + r]r ^ 八 \ ( l + r)^ , \ ( l + 0 ' J 
V. 匕 ~" 乂 
u{e, -e*) 1 [l + r T ^ ,. ^ ( u^cj^ Y| =-^ - + (ue * +c/) - 2y 7 + X > 
1 + r l + r [ r � U ! + , ) ) [ 
二 u{e, - 一) + 1 L . +d _ 2y p ^ + x 1 | . (50) 
1 + r r [ L(l + r) ' 丄 
产 产 1 � 
1 \ �w2o"2 1 
From (50), expected price is: p = -< ue * +d - 2y (! + 广” + X > • (52) 
Method Two- By (21d), (47) and (44) 
Since ai = 1 in De Long s mode^ (44) becomes: 
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= ^ ^ ^ + l | _ _ 2 y f ^ ^ ) | (A22) 
‘ l + r r [ V “ 义 
From(21d): P = u. (A19) 
U^CT^ 
From (21d) and (47): (C + X ) 二 (D + Y ) 二 "^^^^ + X • (51) 
Substituting (A19) and (51) into (A22), we have (50) and (52). 
Appendix Sixteen 
Bhushan�s Model- Derivation of (53a)，(53b) and (53c) 
2 2 U^O^ 
Assumeb^ _^-^+X.Fornotationconvenience,letN= -~~~—. From (46): 2 (l + r)2 (1 + , ) 
r u{C^X) T g^ 
" [ w ( C + Z ) + (l-M)(Z) + F)J (l + r)2 
—_ ( c+幻 T-A, 
M(c+x)+( i -w)(Z)+r) 
[uC+(l-u)N+X]^ = (C+X)^ 
{u^' + 2uC[(l-u)N+X] + [(l-u)N+X]2}C = (C+X)^ 
u2C3 + 2u[(l-u)N+X]C' + [(l-u)N+X]^ = (C^XC+X^)N 
u2C3 + {2u[(l-u)N+X]-N>C' + {[(l-u)N+X]^XN|C - X ^ = 0 
u^^ + {2uN-2u^[+2uX-N>C' + {(l-u)^[^(l-u)XN+X^-2XN>C - X^^ = 0 
u^C' + {2uN-2u^+2uX-N)C' + {u^[^uNW-2uXN+X'>C - X ^ = 0 
u'C3 + 2uNC' - 2u^^C' + 2uXC' - NC' + u^^C - 2uN^ + N'C 
-2uXNC + X ^ - X ^ = 0 
u'C" + X'C - NC' + 2uXC' + 2uNC' - u ^ C 
- u ^ C ' + u ^ ^ - 2uN^ + N'C - 2uXNC - X ^ = 0 
{u^' - NC + 2uXC + 2uNC - u^sfC + X'}C 
- { u ^ ' - u^FC + 2uNC - NC + 2uXC + X'}N 二 0 
{u^C' - P^-2uX-2uN+u^^]C + X2}C - {u'C' - [u^S[-2uN+N-2uX]C + X'}N = 0 
{u2C2 - [(u^u+l)N-2uX]C + X2}C - {u'C2 - [(u'-2u+l)N-2uX]C + X^}N = 0 
{u2c2 - [(l-u)^-2uX]C + X2}C - {u2c2 - [(l-u)^^-2uX]C + X^}N = 0 
{C-N} {u'C2 - [(l-u)^T-2uX]C + X2} = 0 (A23) 
The second {...} in the right hand side of(A23) is a 2nd degree equation of C, 
which can be further factorized by the quadratic formula: 
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[(1 - uf N - 2uX] 土 Jl(l - uy N - 2uXf - 4u'X^' C = 2 t / 2 " ~ " 
_ [(1 - uf N - 2uX] ± V(1 - uy N' - 4u(l - uf XN 
= 产2 
[ ( i - " ) 2 A T - 2 u z ] i J ( i - " m i - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ] 
二 “"““^  ZZZZ7" 
[(l-^02iV — 2 u X ] ± ( l - " ) 2 A ^ J l - ^ ^ ^ ^ 
= ‘ “ “ ^ 
afiz^Yiii r i ^ l - ^ 
2 ( w ) [ ]| ( l - w ) ' A T j w 
= l f l z i i Y j l ± V A l - - (A24) 
2v u J u 
. A 1 ^yX . 4X\ l + r f 
where A = 1-^^ 7777 = l — • 
(l-ufN u [(l-w)<T 
Substituting (A24) into (A23), the complete factorization of (A23) is: 
{ Q - N ) { Q - [ i ( - ) ^ N ( l + V A ) - ^ ] ) { C 3 - 4 ( - ) ^ N ( l - V A ) - ^ ] ) = 0 , 2 u u L u u 
(A25) 
and noise-generated price variances in the three equiUbria are respectively: 
C \ : N : ^ ^ * , (53a) 
1 (l + r)2 
C = i f l z ! l ) 2 _ + V X ] - I = i ( l - " ) 2 f L j i - _ _ i ± ^ l 2 | _ I 
2 2 l w J L J t/ 2 (l + r)2 ]| u ( l - u y 7 _ [ W 
、 乂 
(53b) 
c - i f i z i i ) 2 _ _ v x ] - i = i ( i - " ) 2 ? L j i - j 4 ~ ^ T l - i . 
^ "^2l ^^」尋州 U 2 (l + ,)2 i u _(l-u)a_ U 
� J 
(53c) 
Ci represents the unique noisy equilibrium in DeLong�s model. In Bhushans model, 
we could have at most two other distinct roots, C2 and C3. 
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Appendix Seventeen 
Existence ofDe Longs Unique Noisy Equilibrium in 
Bhushans Model 
The condition is that either Ci = C2 = Q , or C2 and C3 not exist, where C” C2, 
C3 are defmed in (53a), (53b) and (53c). 
( i . ) C i 二 C^ 二 C3: 
IfC2 and C3 are repeated roots, A = 0，and so 
1 - ~ ^ 二 0 (l-ufN 
X = " ) 2 # . (A26) 4u 
Substituting (A26) into (47b) and (47c)，we have: 
C 2 � | H " 4 H " 
2、u ) 八 u J 
l f l - u ) \ , 
二 N 4V w J 
二丄(1一权)2广 (A27) 
4 (l + r)2 
For Ci, C2 and C3 to be identical, we set (47a) = (A27), then, 
uW ^ l ( l - u f a ' 
(l + r)2 ~4 (l + r)2 
2 ( l - " )2 u : 
4 
3u' + 2u - 1 = 0 
( 3 u - l ) ( u + l ) = 0 
w - i . (A28) 
w V ' a ' 
Substituting (A28) to (47a)，we have: Q =(丄 + 力】二 9(^  + ,)2 . 
Substituting into (A26), we have: h ( l : j ^ 2 7 ^ ) 2 • 、嗎 
(A29) is identical to the condition for 柳 + ? 二0，which is the same as (49) 
� d(fC + X) 
� 
105 
when equality holds instead of inequality. Therefore, the first condition by which Q 
is the unique equilibrium is that the maximum slope of the RV Une is 0; in other 
words, we need a non-positive-sloping RV line. 
(ii) C2 and C3 not exist: 
IfC2 and C3 not exist, A < 0，and so: 
l - - i ^ ^ < 0 {l-ufN 
X > f i ^ = 4 ^ . (A30) 
4w 4(l + r)2 
The value o f u that maximizes the term u(l-u)2 in (A30) is: 
3u' - 4u + 1 = 0 
( 3 u - l ) ( u - l ) = 0 
1 u =—. 
3 2 2 2 
Substituting into (A30), we have: ^ > ^4(^^|.)^ =27(7+r)2, w ^ h is exactly 
the inequality in (49). Therefore, the second condition by which Ci is the unique 
equilibrium is that the maximum slope of the RV line is negative; in other words, we 
need a negatively sloping RV line. 
Appendix Eighteen Effect of increasing © on p - (60) 
Differentiating (59) with respect to 0, keeping ^ and " ( 二 ” as constants, we 
have: 
dp 1�*dp 2r(D + y)dp 2rpd(D + Y)' 
— 一 g * 
dQ r\_ dQ u d& u dQ _ 
^J_j ^dp 2y(D + Y)[dp I P d(D + Y)l 
"7[^ ^ u [ ^ (D + Y)~~^~~I 
=iJ *dp 2y(D + r ) � i | p d(D + V)ldp 
" 7 f ^ U [ (D + V) dp \de 
^ l | 2 y ( D ^ r ) L P ^(D^Y)]]^, (A31) 
r] u (D + Y) dp dQ 
‘ L � J 
m r e f o r e，皇<0 if , . > M ^ f i , ^ ^ l (60) dQ u { D + Y dp j 
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Appendix Nineteen 
Effect on Mcreasing © on p - (62)，(63) and (64) 
(i) Limiting p as 0 =0 and 0 = oo 
Substituting p = ~ ~ , … i n t o (61)，we have: M + ( l - w ) 0 
. = i L + _ i f ^ ^ ^ f A _ ~ - + x l l . (A32) 
^~r[ w + (l-w)0 u + (l-u)0[[u + (l-u)ef(l + rf 力 
(A32) is the reduced form equilibrium of expected price in the presence of 
fundamental risk when the NV line is normalized to (D+Y) = 0(C+X) and NE is 
represented by (21a). It can be used to study the effect of increasing 0 on p. We can 
see the limiting expected price when 0 = 0 and oo： d + Q * 
As 0 — 0， p — ； (62) 
r 
^ l f j 2yX) • 
0 — 00，p — - d — ~ L • (63) 
r � 1-uJ 
(ii) Effect of increasing 0 on p 
It is mathematically easier to differentiate (61) instead of (A32). Differentiating (61) 
with respect to 0, we have: 
^_e*dp 2yU P'cr' ^ ^yp(d ! 2QygV^ dp]^ (糊 
^ " T ^ " 7 w [ l ^ ( l + r)' J d% (l + r)2^/0j. 
Note that: 
i = 丄 ( _ _ t _ _ 1 = - • 汉 ） = V ^ ] p 2 ； (A34) 
de cm{u+(i-u)ej [u+(i-u)ef v ^ ； 
dpe _ d ( u& ^ _g/[t/ + (l-g/)0]-x/0(l-g/) ^ U^ _p2 
^ " ^ U + a - M ) © ； " [u + (l-u)ef "[M + (l-w)0f . 
(A35) 
Substituting (A34) and (A35) into (A33), we have: 
^=JkUL]^02 2r\f fiW 1 ^ f l - u y e f i ' a ' ^ , ' 
c m ~ 1 u J r P n / [ | , ( H - r ) ' J 1 u J ( l + r ” _ 
=fl-i^]e*2 _M«2 2 , �g 2 f l - " ) 2 G a ' , 
一 t w J r P ru P ru[(l + ry^ 1 u J(l + r)' 
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= _ - f k : j i ) C + M V + 2 y g 2 [ 问 2 0 - 山 4 
( u J r r u � rw(l + 02 匕、u J � 
r _ — ^ 2 
二，2yci2 r^Ji]20-l p'-(l-u)e*-2rxi^. (64) 
S^ + ry[{ u j J r u 
The 3'd term in {...} is definitely negative, whereas since we assume e* > 0, the 
2"^  term is also negative. The sign of (64) then depends solely on the sign of the 1幼 
j f » 
term When 0 < , the first term in {•..} is negative. Since all terms in {•..} 
• 2 ( l - w ) 
are negative, — is negative. When © > ~ ^ ^ , the first term is positive. Ifboth 
^ dQ 2(l-w) 
e* and X are small, positive effect ofthe 广 term dominates the negative effects of 
the 2°d and 3'^  terms; — is positive. I fe* and/or X are large, positive effect of the 
dS 
1幼 term is dominated by the negative effects ofthe 2°^  and 3'^  terms; ^ is negative. 
When 0 rises further, the first term falls as the P^  in the 1幼 term falls continuously. 
Up to some point, the positive effect of the 1幼 term is dominated by the negative 
effects ofthe 2°^  and 3'^  terms; ^ is negative. 
a0 
Appendix Twenty 
Effect ofMcreasing ©i and &2 on © - (67) 
Noisy expectation of n on retum variance defines a function o f 0 in (66). By 
the same logic, i�s rational expectation on retum variance (i.e. the RV line of (47)) 
defines another function of 0: 
i ^ = e ' J ^ ] l ^ ^ - l l (A36) 
(C + X) {l-u)[c'' (l + r) J 
Thus, (A36) regards 0' as a function ofC, i.e. 0' = g(C). 
Define G 三 0° - & ^ © i , ©2，Q - g(C) = 0. We could utilize the implicit 
function theorem to calculate the effect of changes in ©1 and ©2 on price variance 
whhout actually solve for the exact value of(C+X). Differentiating (66) with respect 
to ©1, ©2 and C respectively, we have: 
" :^ = , i = f 7 ^ > o ; ( • ) 
cm^ yC + XJ 
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^ = / , = f - ^ l > 0 ; (A38) 
cm, h {c+x) 
# i 0 ^ z W < o . (A39) dC Jc (C + Z)2 
Differentiating (A36) with respect to C, we have: 
i : S 二-_1_(丄)丄<0. (A40) dC 2C'' l-u l + r 
Applying implicit function theorem to G =f(0i, ©2, Q - g(C) = 0，we have: 
^ = - 丛 二 - _ L ； and (A41) 
d%^ dGc fc-gc 
_ ^ 二 _ 丛 二 - _ L . (A42) 
(^2 而 fc-gc 
Substituting (A37), (A39), (A40) to (A41) and (A38), (A39), (A40) to (A42), we 
have: 
f C ) 
^ = s £ ± A L _ _ — — ； (A43) 
d&i ( 0 2 - @ i ) Z _ _ 1 f u ) g 
{C + Xf"一2C'{y-u)X + r 
( X ^ 
^ = LC + 幻 _ _ — — . (A44) 
J 0 2 ( Q 2 - ^ 1 ) ^ 一_1 ( ^ ) g 
{C + Xf~~一 2C'' [l-u)l + r 
/ C \ f X \ dC dC 
Since and are positive，-^ and ^ ^ are of the same sign, 
{c+x) lc+xj ae, de^ 
and this sign is depending on the denominator of (A43) and (A44). Accordingly, both 
- ^ ^ and - ^ ^ > 0 only if: cm, dQ^ 
( 0 r 0 i ) Z - _ l _ p q i or (C + Xf 2C'' {l-uJl^r 
^ 八、 1 f u ) a (C + Xf ,A7� 
( 0 , - 0 i ) > " " " r r ; r " ^ . (67) 
�2 1乂 2C'' J-u, 1 + r X 
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